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INTRODUCTION
Since 9/11, the United States has deployed many strategies
to combat global terrorism. It has pursued wars in Afghanistan
and in Iraq; launched drone strike campaigns over regions of
Pakistan; and frozen the assets of thousands of individuals and
organizations purportedly linked to terrorism. Additionally, one
very powerful tool that the United States has deployed has been
the prosecution and punishment of persons for overseas acts of
terrorism, a strategy that makes use of both the country's Article
III courts and its newly created military commissions. This
Article focuses on the government's use of the federal court
system for prosecuting extraterritorial acts of terrorism in the so-
called "War on Terror."' It explores what Due Process Clause
constraints have been imposed by courts, and whether those
constraints have been sufficient.
While the focus in the media and in Congress over the last
several years has been on the propriety of convening military
commissions to try persons who are detained by the government
as enemy combatants, it is the Article III courts, in fact, that
have served as the country's central instrument for subjecting
' The Obama Administration has decidedly parted with the term "War on
Terror." See Oliver Burkeman, Obama Administration Says Goodbye to 'War on
Terror,' THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 25, 2009 5:40 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2009/mar/25/obama-war-terror-overseas-contingency-operations ("A message
sent recently to senior Pentagon staff explains that 'this administration prefers to
avoid using the term Long War or Global War On Terror (Gwot) ... please pass this
on to your speechwriters'.") (alteration in original). But rhetoric aside, the
Administration's May 2010 National Security Strategy commits in no shy terms to a
"global campaign" against terrorist networks. NA'L SECURITY COUNCIL, NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY 19 (2010) ("The United States is waging a global campaign
against al-Qa'ida and its terrorist affiliates. To disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-
Qa'ida and its affiliates, we are pursuing a strategy that protects our homeland,
secures the world's most dangerous weapons and material, denies al-Qa'ida safe
haven, and builds positive partnerships with Muslim communities around the
world."). This Article will use the phrase "War on Terror" because of its descriptive
convenience, but does not intend to express any political position on its
appropriateness.
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terrorists to legal process. Since 9/11, the United States has
obtained nearly 600 convictions in Article III courts against
persons for crimes associated with terrorism; in military
commissions, meanwhile, it has obtained a mere six convictions.2
Moreover, while many of the individuals that the United States
has prosecuted for terrorism crimes since 9/11 have been
Americans or foreigners conducting their activities from within
the United States-persons falling under conventional concepts
of "jurisdiction"-a significant number have been non-nationals,
conducting their activities from abroad. For this latter group, the
application of United States penal law has been on a wholly
extraterritorial basis.
The problem is that due process has gone largely
unmentioned throughout all of this. Today, when the United
States indicts a foreign citizen for violating American terrorism
statutes from some place overseas, it is rare that the defendant
challenges the district court's jurisdiction under the Due Process
2 See infra notes 24-25, 27 and accompanying text.
' "National" and "territorial" jurisdiction are the two most common bases of
jurisdiction recognized by United States and international law. "National
jurisdiction" refers to jurisdiction over persons who are citizens or legal permanent
residents of a political community. "Territorial jurisdiction" refers to jurisdiction
over all persons who are physically located within a territory when they carry out
their conduct. For sources recognizing the national jurisdiction principle, see
Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941) (holding that the United States can
prescribe the conduct of its own citizens upon the high seas); Blackmer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421, 436 (1932) (holding that a United States citizen living in
France was subject to punishment for violating United States law); and
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(2)
(1987) ("[A] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to ... the activities,
interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its
territory. . . ."). For sources recognizing the territorial jurisdictional principle, see
Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1909), overruled in part
as stated in Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2887 n.11 (2010)
(noting the "almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or
unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is
done"); Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) ("The
jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and
absolute."); Rafael v. Verelst, (1776) 96 Eng. Rep. 621, 623 ("Crimes are in their
nature local, and the jurisdiction of crimes is local."); and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(1) ("[A] state has jurisdiction
to prescribe law with respect to. . .conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes
place within its territory. . . ."). In this Article, the term "domestic jurisdiction" will
be used to refer to jurisdiction arising under either a national or territorial principle.
The term "extraterritorial jurisdiction" will be used to refer to jurisdiction where
neither factor is present-in other words, where the individual is neither a national
nor is territorially present in the state in which he is being tried.
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Clause.4 It is even more rare for a court to address the issue sua
sponte. The prosecution proceeds, with all parties assuming that
the application of United States criminal law to the defendant is
substantively fair, raising no problems from a jurisdictional
perspective.' But this might not always be true. Several federal
terrorism statutes outlaw conduct that not only is sanctioned in
foreign territories, but that involves activities far removed from
the actual infliction of harm or violence vis-A-vis the United
States.' A deeper look at the case law shows that there have
been a number of terrorism prosecutions since 9/11 in which it is
arguable that the defendant was denied fair warning that his
activities abroad might make him a criminal in the United
States.' In these cases, the individual rights that we typically
expect the Due Process Clause to protect are put at risk.
' Defendants do routinely challenge terrorism statutes under the Due Process
Clause for other reasons, such as arguing that they are unconstitutionally vague, see
for example Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010), or
that they infringe on protected activities, see for example United States v. Shah, 474
F. Supp. 2d 492, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). But those types of challenges are not the focus
of this Article.
I See infra notes 38-56 and accompanying text.
6 See, for example, 18 U.S.C.A § 2339B(a)(1) (West 2011), which makes it a
federal crime to "knowingly provide[] material support or resources to a foreign
terrorist organization." Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339A(b)(1) defines "material support" to
mean "any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or
monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training,
expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification,
communications equipment, facilities. . . ." This statute sweeps far broader than
many foreign countries' laws. E.g., Case C-340/08, The Queen ex rel M v. Her
Majesty's Treasury [[ 56-74 (Apr. 29, 2010), available at http://curia.europa.eu/
jcms/jcms/j_6 (holding that European laws banning terrorist financing still authorize
social security payments to be made to terrorists' wives); see also Samuel T. Morison,
History and Tradition in American Military Justice, 33 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 121, 124
(2011) ("[Sleveral of the offenses codified in the [Military Commissions Act]
notoriously have no grounding in the standard menu of sources for identifying
the substantive content of customary international law .... Perhaps most
conspicuously, Congress incorporated the federal crime of 'providing material
support for terrorism' into the MCA, despite the fact that this is a novel statutory
offense that was not even conceived until the mid-1990s, and has never been
considered a law-of-war offense by any other nation."); Anthony J. Colangelo,
Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection
of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 121, 177 (2007) (explaining
that "providing material assistance" to terrorists does not qualify as a universally
condemned offense).
7 See infra Part I.B.
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This Article probes the reasons for the impoverished nature
of the due process doctrine in contemporary extraterritorial
terrorism cases. First, it shows that it is not just terrorism cases
in which courts have failed to develop a due process test-it is
the large majority of cases involving extraterritorial crimes
altogether. Next, this Article offers an explanation: It suggests
that the reason the Due Process Clause has been largely absent
when it comes to the extraterritorial application of the criminal
law, both in terrorism cases and others, is that the type of
extraterritorial prosecution that would necessitate such a test is a
relatively recent feature of the American republic. Until roughly
1980, the United States only sought to apply its penal laws
beyond the country's borders in two situations: when foreigners
committed "universal crimes," and when they perpetrated crimes
against the United States. Both categories of offenses failed to
raise due process problems, however, because they each involved
conduct that foreign defendants should have expected would
trigger criminal liability in the United States. It was only in
1980 that Congress passed a statute that both applied overseas
and that wrapped foreigners into a distinctly American criminal
code of conduct. Similar statutes have since been passed; the
problem is that constitutional doctrine has lagged behind.
If the lack of a due process test for regulating the
extraterritorial application of United States criminal law is a
product primarily of historical fact, should we be satisfied with
the current state of the law? Certainly not. In fact, the absence
of a due process test for monitoring the extraterritorial reach of
criminal statutes is inconsistent with two other foundational
bodies of American law. First, under the law that applies in
"domestic" criminal trials, where the defendant is either an
American citizen or is located in the United States when he
commits his crime,8 the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
unquestionably limit when a court can impose punishment.
Three doctrines-the Bouie test; the void-for-vagueness test; and
the rule of lenity-all apply as extensions of the Due Process
Clause to ensure that the criminal defendant is given fair
warning before a court can hear the case.9 Second, under the
law that applies when U.S. civil statutes are enforced
8 See supra note 3.
* See infra Part III.A.
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extraterritorially, courts have also limited jurisdiction according
to a notice requirement since the time those statutes have had
purchase overseas. The federal government has sought to
enforce U.S. antitrust and securities fraud statutes abroad since
the 1950s and '60s. In turn, U.S. courts have required that the
foreign defendant be given ample warning of his potential for
incurring liability domestically, before allowing such
prosecutions to proceed.' 0
Both the domestic criminal jurisprudence and the
extraterritorial civil jurisprudence point to one conclusion: The
Due Process Clause should be made to regulate over
extraterritorial applications of American criminal law. Before we
subject a foreigner to criminal jurisdiction in a United States
court, we must be assured that he was on notice. Fortunately,
the Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals has made
this realization in recent drug-trafficking cases and has
developed a "nexus test" for ensuring that extraterritorial
enforcement complies with the Due Process Clause." These
Ninth Circuit cases should point the way forwards for U.S. courts
in extraterritorial terrorism prosecutions and beyond.' 2
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows.
Part I discusses the United States government's current use of
the Article III courts to combat global terrorism. First, it reviews
data to show that there has been a whopping number of
extraterritorial prosecutions for terrorism crimes brought since
9/11. Second, it surveys the case law to demonstrate that U.S.
courts have failed to develop a due process test for assessing
extra-jurisdictionality in those terrorism cases, and that this has
1o See infra Part III.B.
" See infra Part III.C.
12 This is not the first article to make this normative assertion. In their path-
breaking Harvard Law Review article in 1992, Lea Brilmayer and Charles Norchi
advocated for a Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause test that would regulate over
all extraterritorial applications of United States law, criminal and civil. Lea
Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due
Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1233-34 (1992). But since Brilmayer and Norchi's
piece almost twenty years ago, there has been no serious scholarly piece that revisits
their argument. This Article fills that void. Moreover, it builds on Brilmayer and
Norchi's work in several ways: it situates the analysis in the recent terrorism cases;
it offers a historical explanation for why extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction suffers
from its current deficiencies; and it uses other bodies of law, such as anti-trust and
securities fraud law, to frame its recommendation for the extraterritorial criminal
law.
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been problematic because several cases have raised due process
questions. Part II puts the discussion in Part I in context by
exploring the larger body of United States law on extraterritorial
criminal jurisdiction. First, Part II.A shows that the lack of a
due process doctrine for limiting terrorism prosecutions is
actually par for the course; as a whole, federal court opinions
allowing for the extraterritorial application of the criminal law
have been largely silent on the Due Process Clause. Next, Part
II.B claims that the reason for this state of the doctrine is
historical. Extraterritorial crimes necessitating a due process
analysis only date back to 1980. In Part III, this Article shifts to
a normative argument. Drawing on domestic criminal law in
Part III.A and on the law concerning the extraterritorial
enforcement of federal civil statutes in Part III.B, this Article
argues that the absence of a Due Process Clause test for
prosecuting overseas crimes is inconsistent with core tenants in
American law. Part III.C examines drug-trafficking cases in the
Ninth Circuit since the 1990s, the one body of cases in which
judges have begun to fill the holes. In the Conclusion, this
Article seeks to apply the lessons from Part III to contemporary
extraterritorial terrorism cases. It sketches the outlines of a Due
Process Clause test that U.S. courts should apply in terrorism
prosecutions going forward.
I. SUBJECTING FOREIGN TERRORISTS TO UNITED STATES
CRIMINAL LAW
A. The Centrality of Criminal Trials in the "War on Terror"
Over the past two years, there has been significant political
debate and media attention devoted to the use of military
commissions for trying terrorists. President Bush convened
military commissions by executive order in November 2001,
authorizing them to preside over persons alleged to be members
of al Qaida or to have "engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired
to commit, acts of international terrorism."'3 The Supreme Court
enjoined the Bush commissions in 2006, finding that they
"lack[ed] the power to proceed because [their] structure[s] and
procedures violate both the UCMJ [the (Uniform Code of Military
13 Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833, 57834 (Nov. 13, 2011).
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Justice)] and the four Geneva Conventions signed in 1949."14
Congress responded in 20061 and 2009,16 but whether the
commissions should actually be used has remained a politically
charged and divisive issue throughout.
When he took office in January 2009, President Obama
barred executive officials from bringing new prosecutions in
military commissions while he formulated his terrorism
prosecution and detention policies." The Obama Administration
then flip-flopped its position on whether to use military
commissions several times-it vacillated over whether to
prosecute the 9/11 defendants in an Article III court or in a
commission,' 8 and throughout 2010, stalled in five other cases
that it earlier deemed ripe for military commissions." In March
2011, President Obama signed an executive order directing that
military commissions for accused terrorists at Guantanamo Bay
resume, 20 and in April 2011, Attorney General Holder withdrew
the criminal indictment pending against five 9/11 defendants
in New York and authorized their cases to be tried before
" Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 560 (2006).
"6 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat.
2600, 2602 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948b(a) (2006)) (creating a new set of military
commissions for trying "unlawful enemy combatants").
16 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84,
§ 1802, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009) (making several procedural improvements to the
commissions).
" Exec. Order No. 13, 492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009).
18 Compare Press Release, Dep't of Justice & Dep't of Defense, Departments
of Justice and Defense Announce Forum Decisions for Ten Guantanamo Bay
Detainees (Nov. 13, 2009), http://wwwjustice.gov/opalpr/2009/November/09-ag-
1224.html [hereinafter Press Release] ("The Attorney General, in consultation with
the Secretary of Defense, has determined that the United States government will
pursue a prosecution in federal court against five detainees who are currently
charged in military commissions with conspiring to commit the Sept. 11, 2001 terror
attacks, which killed nearly 3,000 individuals."), with Josh Gerstein, Return to
Military Tribunals?, POITICO (Mar. 5, 2010, 12:28 AM), http://www.politico.com/
news/stories/0310/33965.html (reporting that "top advisers to President Barack
Obama are preparing to recommend that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and other
alleged September 11 plotters be tried before military commissions-not in a civilian
court as Attorney General Eric Holder initially announced last year").
19 In late 2009, the Obama Administration announced that prosecutions in an
additional five cases, not related to 9/11 but also involving Guantanamo detainees,
would proceed in military commissions. Press Release, supra note 18. However, it
failed to advance these prosecutions in 2009 and 2010.
20 See Scott Shane & Mark Landler, Obama Clears Way for Guantdnamo Trials,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2011, at A19.
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commissions in Guantanamo. 21 Every single one of these
announcements by the Administration provoked a cacophony of
responses in Congress, the media, and the academy. Most
recently, in the summer of 2011, the fixation on Capitol Hill was
with the prosecution of a Somali terror suspect, Ahmed
Warsame. The Administration announced that it would bring
suit against Warsame in federal court,22 and dozens of lawmakers
immediately lambasted the decision.23
Meanwhile, despite all of the attention that has been paid
toward military commissions, the real adjudicative action vis-b-
vis foreign terrorists since 9/11 has been in Article III courts.
According to the Center on Law and Security at New York
University, from September 11th 2001 through September 11th
2010, the United States government brought 998 criminal
indictments against persons for terrorism-associated crimes,
resolved 688 of them,2 4 and obtained a conviction rate of nearly
eighty-seven percent.2 5 The National Security Division of the
Justice Department releases data on a more narrow set of
terrorism cases-namely, those that involve the most serious
terrorism offenses under federal law such as hostage-taking and
sabotage of nuclear facilities-and it reports that between 2001
and March 2010, the government obtained 150 convictions under
21 See Nolle Prosequi and Unsealing Order, United States v. Mohammed, No.
(S14) 93 Cr. 180 (KTD) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2011), available at www.justice.gov/opa/
documents/nolle-unsealing-order.pdf (order granting nolle prosequi after the United
States filed a motion to withdraw the criminal indictment).
22 See Eileen Sullivan, Administration Defends Terror Prosecution Decision,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 26, 2011.
23 See, e.g., id. (describing a letter sent by forty-three senators to Attorney
General Eric Holder, on July 6, 2011, rejecting the "government's decision to try
Warsame in civilian court" as opposed to in a military commission); Joseph I.
Lieberman & Kelly Ayotte, Editorial, Why We Still Need Guantanamo, WASH. POST,
July 22, 2011, at A17 (arguing against Warsame's trial in civilian court).
24 N.Y.U. SCH. OF LAW CENTER ON LAW & SEC., TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD:
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001-SEPTEMBER 11, 2010, at 4 (2010) [hereinafter TERRORIST
TRIAL REPORT CARD 2010]. Of the 998 criminal indictments, 315 were for direct
violations of about ten "core" terrorism statutes. Id. at 3, 4 & n.2, 5. The remainder
were for criminal conspiracies and other national security violations associated with
terrorism. N.Y.U. SCH. OF LAw CENTER ON LAw & SEC., TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT
CARD: SEPTEMBER 11, 2001-SEPTEMBER 11, 2009, at i, 1, 124 (2010) [hereinafter
TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD 20091 (demonstrating the non-"core" terrorism
prosecutions were for these types of crimes).
25 TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD 2010, supra note 24, at 4. Accordingly, 598
individuals were convicted of a terrorism-related charge either by trial or by guilty
plea. Id.
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the statutes it surveyed.2 6 Meanwhile, military commissions
have been far less fruitful tribunals. They have reached
convictions in only six cases since September 11th-one of which
is still on appeal.27 The remaining cases that the Bush
Administration initiated in the commissions were either stalled
by procedural issues or were removed to the criminal system.2 8
Moreover, major questions surrounding the military commissions
are still unresolved, and they will likely need to be addressed by
the Supreme Court in order for the commissions to become a
reliable and authoritative source of decision making altogether.
For instance, must the tribunals respect defendants' rights under
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments? Is it constitutional for the
commissions to take jurisdiction over offenses like material
support and conspiracy, given that they are not widely
recognized under the law of war?29 Criminal proceedings against
26 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATISTICS ON UNSEALED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
AND TERRORISM-RELATED CONVICTIONS 1-2, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/
doj032610-stats.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).
2' For the statistic that six convictions have been obtained in military
commissions since 9/11, see Military Commissinos Cases, MILITARY COMMISSIONS,
http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx (last visited Mar. 14, 2012) (in
the "Search By: Status" bar, select "Completed" and "On Appeal" for all cases in
which convictions have been obtained). Two defendants, Salim Ahmed Hamdan and
Ali Hamza Ahmed Sulayman al-Bahlul, appealed their convictions to the Court of
Military Commission Review. See id.; see also David Frakt, Op-Ed., Terrorists
Should Be Tried in Court, CNN.COM (Mar. 17, 2010, 7:19 A.M.), http://www.cnn.com/
2010/OPINION/03/17/frakt.military.trials/. In June 2011, the review tribunal
affirmed Mr. Hamdan's conviction in an en banc decision, see United States v.
Hamdan, CMCR 09-002 1, 86 (C.M.C.R. June 24, 2011) (en banc) (affirming
conviction below), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/
2011/06/hamdan.pdf, but it has yet to rule on Mr. al-Bahlul's petition, see Order, al
Bahlul v. United States, No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 6, 2012), available at http://
www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Bahlul.pdf (granting al-Bahlul's
motion for leave to file an appeal).
28 Frakt, supra note 27 (explaining why so few cases have been succesfully tried
in military commissions). While the Obama Administration announced in March
2011 it was reinitiating its use of military commissions, see supra notes 20-21, and
while three additional guilty pleas have been secured since then, see supra note 27,
it remains to be seen how the other cases progress.
29 Both Mr. Hamdan and Mr. al-Bahlul argued in their appellate briefs to the
Court of Military Commissions Review that it was not constitutional for
commissions to adjudicate over such offenses. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 21-25,
United States v. al-Bahlul, CMCR Case No. 09-001 (U.S. Court of Military
Commission Review, Sept. 1, 2009) (arguing that neither material support nor
conspiracy constitute "terrorism" under the international law of war and that the
military commission thus lacked jurisdiction over such crimes). However, the court
rejected these arguments in the case of Mr. Hamdan and affirmed his conviction. See
Hamdan, CMCR 09-002 at 86. Mr. Hamdan is now pressing the same arguments
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terrorists in federal courts certainly also pose questions-hence,
the subject of this Article-but their fundamental legitimacy is
not in question.
The Article III system has served as the country's primary
engine for submitting terrorists to legal process. Moreover, it is
important to point out that federal courts are not just being used
to prosecute domestic terrorists, but also to prosecute foreigners
for their conduct overseas. New York University ("NYU") reports
that only 273 of the 804 defendants (thirty-four percent) charged
of terrorism-associated crimes between 2001 and 2009 were
United States citizens; the rest were either citizens of foreign
countries or persons for whom no indication of citizenship was
found.30 NYU also finds that a large number of terrorism
defendants have been indicted for acts they committed overseas.
Of the 243 individuals whose indictments involved descriptions of
a specific target between 2001 and 2009, sixty-seven percent
were allegedly planning to attack a target overseas. 1
Finally, the government is also using the Article III courts to
punish a wide array of terroristic conduct overseas. At one end of
the spectrum, it has brought a criminal indictment against a
foreigner for committing an overt act of war. In United States v.
al-Delaema, the United States indicted a Dutch citizen for
attempting to bomb U.S. troops in Iraq,3 2 marking the first time
the government turned to the Article III system to punish an
attack on American troops in Iraq.33 At the other end of the
spectrum, the government has sought criminal penalties against
before the D.C. Circuit, see Brief of Petitioner Salim Ahmed Hamdan, Hamdan v.
United States, No. 11-1257, 2011 WL 5569434, (D.C. Cir. Nov. 15, 2011), and, if the
Justices allow it, will likely do so before the Supreme Court as well. For sources
agreeing with Hamdan's position, at least with respect to material support, see
Morrison, supra note 6, and Colangelo, supra note 6.
30 TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD 2009, supra note 24, at 20.
"' Id. at 16.
32 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Iraqi-Born Dutch Citizen Sentenced to 25
Years in Prison for Terrorism Conspiracy Against Americans in Iraq (Apr. 16, 2009),
available at http://wwwjustice.gov/opalpr/2009/April/09-nsd-355.html.
" Id. The defendant was a Dutch citizen who, in 2003, drove his car from the
Netherlands to Iraq and helped a group of combatants plant improvised explosive
devices ("IEDs") in the roadway outside Fallujah. See Gov't's Sentencing
Memorandum to al-Delaema, Docket No. 99 (D.D.C. Apr. 3, 2009). The United States
indicted al-Delaema in 2005 and obtained his extradition in 2007. He subsequently
pled guilty to the charge of conspiracy to kill a U.S. national and agreed to serve
twenty-five years in federal prison. See TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD 2009, supra
note 24, at 56.
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foreign actors for conspiratorial activities that resemble
organized crime. In fact, NYU reports that the majority
of persons indicted for terrorism crimes since 9/11 have fallen
into this latter category, as they were charged not with conduct
linked to a specific target but with inchoate offenses such as
lending financial support or recruiting members to terrorist
organizations.35 The Justice Department commissioned a report
in 2008 which similarly found that "[n]early 85% of the terrorism
cases in the pre-9/11 era were event-linked . . .. After 9/11, the
proportion of event-linked cases dropped to just 30% . . ."36 The
shift away from event-linked prosecutions towards inchoate-
offense prosecutions has been driven by the government's
increased use of the material support statute, codified at
18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B. Human Rights First found that
as of 2009, "[tihe most commonly charged substantive offenses in
[its terrorism prosecution] data set continue to be the material
support statutes."3 7
B. Difficult Terrorism Cases that Raise Questions of Notice
The government's decision to use the Article III court system
in its efforts to contain global terrorism is to be celebrated. The
resort to legal process rather than to the use of force vis-A-vis
terrorists ensures that alleged perpetrators are truly guilty of
terrorism before they are retaliated against or subjected to
punishment. The resort to process also prevents the infliction of
collateral damage on innocent bystanders that might otherwise
occur when the United States responds to terrorism with
counterattacks.
34 See TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD 2009, supra note 24, at 21-22 (explaining
that the same preventative strategies used by the government to combat organized
crime are being deployed against terrorism to prevent future attacks).
' Id. at 15-16; see also id. at 9 ("Criminal conspiracy alone would constitute the
most commonly charged statute, having been used in 293 indictments.").
36 CHRIS SHIELDS ET AL., FINAL REPORT: AN ASSESSMENT OF DEFENSE AND
PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGIES IN TERRORISM TRIALS: IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE AND
FEDERAL PROSECUTORS, at xiv (2008), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/
grants/228276.pdf (emphasis omitted).
3 RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN
PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN FEDERAL COURTS: 2009
UPDATES AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 11 (2009); see also TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT
CARD 2009, supra note 24, at 48-51 (finding that the United States charged persons
with the crime of material support in 170 indictments between 2001 and 2009).
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Nonetheless, the work of the Article III system during the so-
called "War on Terror" has not been flawless. A central problem
has been that U.S. courts have failed to develop and routinely
apply a due process test that would ensure that jurisdiction over
foreign terrorists is normatively legitimate, as well as
constitutional. This oversight by the federal courts dates back to
pre-9/11 terrorism cases, such as United States v. Yunis,8 in
which they also failed to ground their analyses in the Due
Process Clause.
In Yunis, a Lebanese citizen was tried and convicted in
federal court in Washington, D.C. for violating American
terrorism laws, such as the law against aircraft piracy and
hostage taking.39 Yunis and a group of associates boarded a
Jordanian commercial plane in Beirut and attempted to fly it to
Tunis, where they hoped to get a meeting with delegates to a
conference of the Arab League.40 Two Americans had been on
board.4' The plane was ultimately blocked from landing and flew
back to Beirut, where the hijackers released the passengers.4 2
Yunis was arrested by United States authorities and charged in
federal court in Washington, D.C.4 3 He contested the court's
jurisdiction by raising statutory, constitutional, and
international law claims,44  but the D.C. Circuit was
unconvinced. 5
The D.C. Circuit's holding might have been correct, but what
was missing from the court's opinion was any discussion of the
Due Process Clause and why it permitted a domestic tribunal to
take jurisdiction over Yunis and allow for the application of
American criminal law to his case.46 Yunis was not a citizen or
38 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
39 Id. at 1088-89.




4 United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 898-99 (D.D.C. 1988) (discussing
the defendant's various arguments to dismiss the indictment).
a Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1090-92.
* See Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 12, at 1251 ("Although the Yunis court
seemed to acknowledge a role for the Constitution in assessing the means by which
Yunis was apprehended, it did not inquire into Fifth Amendment due process limits
on the application of federal law. Further, it is questionable whether Yunis would
meet the usual constitutional tests for the extraterritorial application of law in the
state choice of law context.").
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
resident of the United States, all of his activities occurred
abroad, and he had not sought to violently harm any United
States person, place, or thing during his operations.4 7 Rather,
two American citizens happened to be aboard the plane he
hijacked. 48  The D.C. Circuit did not discuss these issues. It
summarily held that the two federal statutes under which Yunis
was charged were designed to extend criminal liability to his
situation and that its "inquiry [could] go no farther."49
The D.C. Circuit's failure to evaluate the legitimacy of
extraterritorial jurisdiction in Yunis under the Due Process
Clause is representative of the general approach that courts have
taken in terrorism cases from Yunis, decided in 1991, through
the present day. Even though the United States has prosecuted
dozens, if not hundreds, of foreigners for overseas acts of
terrorism since September 11th,so there is only one precedential
opinion by a circuit court to date-United States v. Yousef'-that
contains a Due Process Clause analysis about the legitimacy of
applying a terrorism statute extraterritorially." In Yousef, the
Second Circuit held that a foreigner who attacked a Philippine
plane as a "test-run" for an attack he sought to deploy in the
United States could be prosecuted domestically because the
nature of his conduct gave him sufficient notice of his likely
culpability in the United States." The Yousef court dealt with
due process, at least, but still only in one paragraph of its
analysis.5 4 Moreover, while this paragraph has been cited in
n Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 898-99.
* Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1089.
* Id. at 1090-91; see also id. at 1092 ("[W]e are satisfied that the Antihijacking
Act authorizes assertion of federal jurisdiction to try Yunis regardless of hijacking's
status vel non as a universal crime [or any other consideration].").
o See supra notes 24-25, 30-37, and accompanying text.
5' 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003).
52 See id. at 111-12. This conclusion is based on the author's extensive search of
the extraterritorial criminal terrorism cases in Westlaw that have been decided
since 9/11. See also United States v. Reumayr, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1222-23
(D.N.M. 2008) (citing Yousef as the only published federal appellate case on the topic
of due process and the extraterritorial reach of terrorism crimes); United States v.
Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that "few cases" have
addressed due process issues about the extraterritorial application of terrorism
statutes).
s 327 F.3d at 112.
See id. ("Applying this standard, it seems clear that assertion of jurisdiction
over the defendants was entirely consistent with due process. The defendants
conspired to attack a dozen United States-flag aircraft in an effort to inflict injury on
this country and its people and influence American foreign policy, and their attack
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terrorism cases decided after Yousef, those cases consist of only a
handful, are concentrated in New York, and lack deep analysis.55
Since 2003, no appellate court has seriously engaged with
Yousefs rationales about extraterritorial jurisdiction, and no
district court has rendered any substantial doctrinal
development of its holding."
Not only have United States courts failed to develop a due
process test for evaluating jurisdiction in extraterritorial
terrorism prosecutions, but they have allowed jurisdiction to lie
in questionable cases. In several criminal trials brought against
foreign terrorists since 9/11, a colorable argument can be made
that the defendant was channeled through the American
criminal system without having been on notice that his activities
abroad could subject him to punishment in this country. This
Article does not offer a conclusive judgment on any such cases
examined below, but it maintains that, at the least, they pose
difficult questions about the legitimacy of extra-territorial
jurisdiction.
The first case worth reviewing is United States v. Al Kassar,
which was filed in the Southern District of New York in 2008.w
In Al Kassar, the federal government charged three foreign
nationals with conspiracy to murder, money laundering, and
on the Philippine Airlines flight was a 'test-run' in furtherance of this conspiracy.
Given the substantial intended effect of their attack on the United States and its
citizens, it cannot be argued seriously that the defendants' conduct was so unrelated
to American interests as to render their prosecution in the United States arbitrary
or fundamentally unfair. As a consequence, we conclude that prosecuting the
defendants in the United States did not violate the Due Process Clause.").
6" See United States v. Bout, No. 08 Cr. 365(SAS), 2011 WL 2693720, at *2-3
(S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2011) (holding the prosecution was neither "arbitrary [nior
fundamentally unfair" under Yousef because the indictment alleged the defendant
"offered to sell millions of dollars of weapons to the FARC after acknowledging-at
least three times at the March 6th meeting-his understanding that the FARC
intended to use those weapons to kill U.S. forces in Colombia" and so " 'should [have]
reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into court in this country'") (second and third
alterations in original) (quoting other sources); United States v. Yousef, No. S3 08
Cr. 1213(JFK), 2010 WL 3377499, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2010) (holding the
extraterritorial application of a narco terrorism statute to a defendant who agreed to
sell the FARC military-grade weapons stolen from American forces in Iraq
comported with Yousef); United States v. Al Kassar, 582 F. Supp. 2d 488, 494
(S.D.N.Y. 2008), abrogated in part as stated in, Goldberg v. UBS AG, 690 F. Supp. 2d
92 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Reumayr, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 1222-23.
' This conclusion is based on the author's extensive searching of all federal
court cases that have cited Yousef since 2003.
a 582 F. Supp. 2d 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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material support for terrorism.58 According to the United States,
the defendants helped broker an arms deal with undercover
agents who were pretending to represent the Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia ("FARC"), a paramilitary group in
Colombia that has been classified as a foreign terrorist
organization ("FTO") by the United States since 1997.59 The lead
defendant, Monzer Al Kassar, was a notorious weapons dealer
based out of Spain.60  The other two defendants were Mr. al-
Ghazi, a middle man to Al Kassar who had not worked for him
for the fifteen years leading up to the case, and Mr. Moreno
Godoy, Al Kassar's personal assistant.6  The indictment
described a complicated web of activities among the three
defendants, all of which occurred in Lebanon, Spain, and
Colombia.62 The government argued that jurisdiction was proper
because the defendants had each been aware that the weapons
being brokered by Al Kassar ultimately could be used to injure
U.S. nationals in Colombia." All three defendants filed motions
to dismiss, which the district court denied.'
In his opinion sending the case to trial, Judge Jed Rakoff
summarily resolved several due process issues that this Article
argues merited greater consideration. First, Judge Rakoff
sustained the charges against Misters al-Ghazi and Moreno
Godoy even though, according to the indictment, those
defendants' only conduct had been to help their boss, Al Kassar,
communicate and meet with persons who wanted to buy
68 Id. at 491.
9 See id.
60 Indictment J1 1, 11(a), United States v. Al Kassar, 582 F. Supp. 2d 488
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. S3 07 Cr. 354 (JSR)), 2007 WL 4201655.
6 See Memorandum of Law of Defendant Tareq Mousa al-Ghazi in Support of
Motion to Dismiss the Indictment and Other Relief at 5, United States v. Al Kassar,
582 F. Supp. 2d 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. S3 07 Cr. 354 (JSR)), 2008 WL 5515135
[hereinafter Memorandum of Tareq Mousa al-Ghazi] (explaining that when al-Ghazi
was approached by undercover agents in Lebanon, he had not worked for Al Kassar
for fifteen years and that he informed the agents "that his relationship with Al
Kassar was not strong, [and] that they were not friends anymore"); Pre-Sentence
Memorandum on Behalf of Defendant Moreno Godoy at 1, United States v. Al
Kassar, 582 F. Supp. 2d 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. S3 07 Cr. 354 (JSR)), 2009 WL
700853 [hereinafter Pre-Sentence Memorandum of Moreno Godoy] (explaining that
Mr. Moreno Godoy was "[t]reated like a member of the Al Kassar family, he lived
with them in Marbella, Spain and, indeed, was largely responsible for the
maintenance and operation of the residence, its grounds, and its large staff").
62 See Indictment, supra note 60, 1% 2, 10, 11(a).
6* See id. H 9-10, 13-14.
' See Al Kassar, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 498.
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weapons.65 As per the United States' description of the facts, al-
Ghazi and Moreno Godoy were far removed from the commission
of violence: they worked for a weapons seller, not for any terrorist
group; they were functionaries and aides to Al Kassar, not
persons with authority to broker a deal; and they were not shown
to harbor personal animosity towards the United States. 66 Judge
Rakoff sent both cases to trial, but he never discussed why, from
a due process perspective, it was fundamentally fair to hold these
two foreigners responsible under American criminal law when,
according to the government's own indictments, they were so
many steps removed from the commission of violence against
Americans. A second due process issue in the case that Judge
Rakoff did not discuss concerned al-Ghazi in particular, who
asserted in his motion to dismiss that he never knew that the
buyers would target U.S. persons or interests.67  Al-Ghazi
claimed that the undercover agents originally told him that the
buyers were from the Ivory Coast, and the agents only revealed
months later, in a conversation al-Ghazi did not understand
because it was in a foreign language, that they represented the
FARC."8 The United States did not allege facts in its pre-trial
65 See Indictment, supra note 60, 11(a)-(b), (d), (j), (o)-(p), (r-s), (v), (x), (z)-
(aa), (cc), (ddd)-(eee) (describing the "Overt Acts" that made al-Ghazi criminally
liable, which were primarily his being "presen[t]" at two meetings between the U.S.
agents and Al Kassar at Al Kassar's residence and his "advis[ing] the CSs on how to
negotiate with Monzer Al Kassar ... for the purchase of weapons"); id. 11 (k), (p),
(r)-(s), (u(w), (z)-(aa), (cc), (ee), (hh)--(ii), (kk), (nn), (pp), (tt), (ww)-(xx), (bbb)-
(ddd), (fff) (describing the "Overt Acts" that made Moreno Godoy liable).
I The Indictment alleged no facts about al-Ghazi's or Moreno Godoy's animosity
towards the United States. See id. 1 11. Both defendants claimed they harbored
none. See, e.g., Pre-Sentence Memorandum of Moreno Godoy, supra note 61, at 4
("With respect to the defendant's motives for committing the instant offense, the
Probation Office believes that he was primarily motivated by the prospect of
substantial financial gain. The defendant's niece and defense counsel both contend
that the defendant bears no animosity toward the United States or the American
people.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
a See Memorandum of Tareq Mousa al-Ghazi, supra note 61, at 6-7.
" See id. at 7 ("As made clear in the tape transcripts[,] ... al-Ghazi played
almost no role whatsoever in the negotiations during the series of meetings in Spain
during Spring 2007. In part, this is due to the fact that CS-1 and CS-2, the DEA
operatives posing as the weapons buyers, spoke Spanish, a language neither spoken
nor understood by al-Ghazi, who speaks only Arabic. The majority of the
conversation concerning the details of the proposed weapons transaction was in
Spanish. Therefore, there is no evidence that al-Ghazi actually understood what was
being discussed. As indicated above, he was present at these meetings as the guest,
and at the expense, of a DEA operative, SNH.").
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filings to rebut al-Ghazi's claims on this point.69 But Judge
Rakoff failed to take up the issue in his decision to sustain the
indictment,70 suggesting that jurisdiction would be proper
regardless of whether al-Ghazi knew that the buyers represented
the FARC, a group with a known history of targetting
Americans."
The Al Kassar case presents the fundamental question:
What are the appropriate boundaries on criminal responsibility
under United States law, from a jurisdictional perspective, when
a terroristic plot to cause harm overseas is hatched overseas?
That question in turn contains two parts: a question about
activity level and a question about mens rea. First, with respect
to activity level, assuming that Al Kassar's assistants actually
intended for or knew that the arms Al Kassar was selling would
be used to harm U.S. nationals in Colombia, was their
participation sufficient to subject them to criminal penalty in the
United States? Second, with respect to mens rea, if al-Ghazi and
69 In its response to al-Ghazi's motion to dismiss, the United States only argued:
In his motion, al Ghazi contends that "there is no evidence that al Ghazi
actually understood what was being discussed" during the February and
March 2007 meetings.. In any event, whether or not and at what point
al Ghazi knew the full extent of the criminal conspiracies in which he
participated ... are all issues for a jury trial and not for a pretrial motion
to dismiss.
Government's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and
for Other Relief at 4 n.2, United States v. Al Kassar, 582 F. Supp. 2d 488 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (No. S3 07 Cr. 354 (JSR)), 2008 WL 5515136 (quoting Brief for Defendant at 7,
United States v. Al Kassar, 582 F. Supp. 2d 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)).
70 See Al Kassar, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 494 n.4.
71 One might argue that al-Ghazi's claim of ignorance as to the identity of the
buyers was a merits issue to be dealt with at trial. In other words, whether the
government could actually prove with sufficient evidence that al-Ghazi knew that
the buyers represented the FARC was a "trial" issue concerning whether the
government could win on the merits, not a jurisdictional issue. However, this
argument loses sight of the fact that to bring the case in federal court in the first
place, there must be a jurisdictional hook for the charge. The fact that the
government failed to even allege in its pre-trial filings that al-Ghazi knew that the
buyers represented the FARC triggers not just a merits concern about al-Ghazi's
guilt, but a jurisdictional concern as well, about whether it is even proper to try him
in a United States tribunal. Cf United States v. Bout, No. 08 Cr. 365(SAS), 2011 WL
2693720, at *5 n.73 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2011) ("To the extent Bout's challenges are to
the sufficiency of the Government's evidence to satisfy-as opposed to the sufficiency
of the Indictment to allege-the 'federal elements' of the crimes charged, those
arguments are 'not appropriately decided on a motion to dismiss.' Whether that
evidence will legally satisfy the jurisdictional and other elements of the crimes
charged-the suggestion lurking in all of Bout's 'due process' arguments-is not a
question for this Court today.") (citation omitted).
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Moreno Godoy had not known that the weapons would be used to
target Americans, because, for instance, they had not known that
a group with anti-U.S. leanings was the buyer, would jurisdiction
have been proper? In short, both al-Ghazi and Moreno Godoy
lived in foreign countries and did not look to the United States
legal system as the source of rules to govern their primary
conduct. Thus, what level of activity and what level of mens rea,
with respect to harming Americans, is needed to make
jurisdiction fair?
The 2008 case of United States v. Warsame7 2 also highlights
fairness problems that can arise when U.S. terrorism laws are
given extraterritorial effect. In Warsame, the United States
charged a Canadian citizen in the District Court of Minnesota
with providing material support for terrorism.73 Two of the
activities that rendered him guilty, the government asserted,
were that he "provided English lessons in an Al Qaeda clinic in
Kandahar, Afghanistan, in part to assist nurses in reading
English-language medicine labels,"74 and that he "sent money
overseas to an Al Qaeda member to repay a loan."" Warsame
filed a motion to dismiss.7 He claimed that under the First
Amendment, providing medical training and loaning currency to
members of an organization were constitutionally protected
activities, and in the alternative, should the statute be construed
to apply to his conduct, it was unconstitutionally vague. The
district court disagreed and sent Warsame's case to trial.
In his pre-trial motions, Warsame did not challenge his
prosecution from a jurisdictional perspective. He did not argue
that it violated the Due Process Clause for the United States to
assume jurisdiction over the conduct he performed in Canada
and Afghanistan. 9 Yet, one is left to wonder how such an
72 537 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (D. Minn. 2008).
71 See id. at 1009.
74 Id. at 1019 ("According to the prosecution, the nurses in the clinic attended to
Al Qaeda members who were participating in nearby terrorist training camps. The
alleged English-language training in this case has direct application to a FTO's
terrorist activities, as it would likely speed the healing and eventual return of
terrorist militants to Al Qaeda training camps.").
" Id. at 1017 ("The prosecution alleges that Warsame sent money overseas to an
Al Qaeda member to repay a loan.").
76 Id. at 1009.
77 Id. at 1013, 1016-17.
78 Id. at 1023.
79 Id. at 1020.
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argument would have fared. Should a Canadian citizen like
Warsame be expected to comply with United States law over and
above Canadian law assuming that the former bans English
training to nurses at Al Qaeda camps but the latter does not?
Given that Warsame's direct activities did not involve any
likelihood of causing imminent harm to Americans, why should a
person in his situation expect that he might be punished in an
American court and limit his conduct accordingly?"o
Besides these examples, there are dozens of recent terrorism
cases involving defendants subject to conventional, domestic
jurisdiction"1 that would become problematic from a fairness
standpoint when one imagines extending their holdings
extraterritorially. Federal courts have construed the material
support statute codified in 18 U.S.C. § 2339B to outlaw a very
broad range of conduct. The provision of medical services to
"jihadists" in Afghanistan,8 2 the provision of food and shelter to
members of organizations designated as FTOs," the broadcasting
of Hezbollah programs via U.S. satellite," and the disseminating
of information about terrorist groups' activities on the internet,85
all qualify as material support. Likewise, the federal conspiracy-
o Note, in addition to the training of nurses and loaning of money, the
prosecution also alleged that Warsame "voluntarily participated in an Al Qaeda
training camp in Afghanistan." Id. at 1018. The extraterritorial application of the
law for that type of activity-training with terrorists-is clearly less problematic
from a notice perspective. But the district court did not limit its holding to that
charge.
81 See supra note 3.
8 United States v. Shah, 474 F. Supp. 2d 492, 498-99 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding
that the statute criminalized "volunteer[ing] as a medic for the al Qaeda military" by
making oneself "available specifically to attend to the wounds of injured fighters"
and that such an application was not unconstitutionally vague).
a Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 293, 294 (3d Cir. 2004).
* United States v. Iqbal, No. 1:06-Cr.-01054 (RMB) (S.D.N.Y. 2009). In their
motion to dismiss the indictment, the defendants argued: "Here, Mr. Iqbal and Dr.
Elahwal's conduct as alleged in this case-broadcasting the signal of Al Manar's
television programming-falls squarely within First Amendment parameters." Joint
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Pre-Trial Motions at 11, United
States v. Iqbal, No. 06 Cr. 1054 (RMB) (S.D.N.Y., July 13, 2007). Their motion was
denied, and both defendants ultimately plead guilty.
' United States v. Al-Hussayen, No. CRO3-048-C-EJL, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
29793, at *6-9 (D. Idaho Apr. 6, 2004) (order denying defendant's motion to dismiss
on the basis of his argument that these internet activities were protected under the
First Amendment). The jury ultimately acquitted the defendant on all charges, not
finding sufficient proof of criminal liability. See al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949,
953-54 (9th Cir. 2009), overruled on other grounds 130 S. Ct. 415 (2010) (describing
the resolution of the Al-Hussayen case).
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to-commit-terrorism statute has been construed to have
extremely broad reach, outlawing activities such as serving as a
communications intermediary between an individual in prison
and a foreign group in Egypt," and providing fundraising and
logistical support from the United States to a Palestinian
resistance group. 7 The defendants in the afore-referenced cases
had all been either American citizens or persons physically
present in the United States when they broke the law. But given
that both § 2339B and the conspiracy statute apply
extraterritorially," the statutory constructions in those cases
technically should extend to foreigners based abroad. And
therein lies the rub.
Consider, for instance, applying the outcome in United States
v. Shah" to an extraterritorial defendant. In Shah, a doctor
living in New York City was indicted for materially supporting
terrorism when he purposefully, over the course of two years,
conspired with members of Al Qaeda from his residence in New
York to volunteer as a medic for "wounded jihadists" in
Afghanistan.90 The court found the criminal charge against Shah
consistent with the Due Process Clause, despite his claim that
allowing the statute to condemn his activities would infringe on
his livelihood. Applying § 2339B to Mr. Shah's activities would
not deprive him of any broad "right to practice medicine," the
court held, because it would only prevent him from practicing
medicine "under the control or direction of a terrorist
organization."s' Whatever one thinks of the court's holding in
Shah, the case becomes unquestionably more difficult when one
contemplates extending it to foreigners located abroad. What if
the defendant in Shah had been not a doctor living in New York,
" United States v. Sattar, 314 F. Supp. 2d 279, 295, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
a See Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the
Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 469 n. 211 (2007)
(describing the case of United States v. al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1350 (D. Fla.
2004)).
1 See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-458, § 6603(d), 118 Stat. 3638, 3763 (2004) (rendering § 2339B extraterritorial
in reach by stating it covers offenses committed by any persons "found" in the
United States); 18 U.S.C. § 956(a)(1) (2006) (stating that an individual will be liable
under the conspiracy provision regardless of where he is located, as long as one of
his co-conspirators is "within the jurisdiction of the United States").
" 474 F. Supp. 2d 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
0 Id. at 493-94.
9" Id. at 498.
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but a medic living with his family in Afghanistan in an area that
Al Qaeda took over as a stronghold? If that person were to agree
to provide medical services for Al Qaeda, perhaps because no
other position was available to him in his community, should he
be considered a criminal under United States law? Would he
really stand on equal footing with a defendant like Shah?
Similar difficulties arise when one contemplates extending the
holding in Al-Hussayen, in which a domestic defendant was
prosecuted for disseminating information on the internet,92 to
foreigners acting overseas.93
Clearly, not all extraterritorial prosecutions entail a
potential deprivation of notice for the defendant. When a person
abroad intentionally participates in a plot to violently harm
American individuals or places, such as a plot to bomb a U.S.
embassy or to hijack an American aircraft, his case will raise less
gestalt or constitutional concerns about fair warning. That
defendant purposefully attempted to injure American people or to
destroy government property, and so being forced to take
responsibility in an American court should come as no surprise.94
But given the capacious breadth of the federal terrorism statutes
today, such as the material support statute or the laws banning
conspiracy to commit terrorism, all of which apply overseas,
there is the potential for extraterritorial prosecutions to be more
controversial. The cases profiled in this Part highlight some of
the questions that arise regarding a defendant's fair warning
when the terrorism law is applied to an extraterritorial
defendant. This Article does not suggest that the actual and
hypothetical cases it reviewed should necessarily be resolved in
favor of the defendant, but only that federal courts going forward
should take seriously the questions these cases raise.
" See United States v. Al-Hussayen, No. CR03-048-C-EJL, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 29793, at *6-9 (D. Idaho Apr. 6, 2004).
" This has occurred in a case currently pending in the federal system. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ahmad, No. 3:04-CR-301 (MRK) (D. Conn. 2004) (involving a
British citizen taken from his home in London and extradited to the United States
where he was then tried for conspiracy to provide material support for terrorism;
among the charges in the indictment that the court sustained were the defendant's
creation of websites from which he conducted fundraising for the "global jihad
movement").
94 See the Conclusion below, in which this Article more clearly articulates why
jurisdiction in such cases is consistent with the Due Process Clause.
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II. THE LAW OF EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION:
PRINCIPLES AND HISTORY
This Part seeks to put into context the contemporary
prosecutions of foreign terrorists under United States criminal
law and the due process questions in those cases that courts have
left unanswered. As Part I illustrated, extraterritorial
prosecutions are becoming a key tool in the United States'
arsenal for combating global terrorism, but the jurisdictional
limitations that should attach under the Due Process Clause
have yet to be fleshed out by the courts. This Part shows that
terrorism jurisprudence is a microcosm of a much bigger body of
law that shares the same deficiencies.
Part II.A below reviews the key principles that animate the
larger body of United States law on extraterritorial criminal
jurisdiction. It shows that the absence of a due process doctrine
to condition the law's reach in the terrorism cases is reflected in
the law as a whole. It is not just terrorism cases but immigration
cases, bank fraud cases, and drug trafficking cases where courts
regularly fail to examine whether the imposition of criminal
jurisdiction overseas runs afoul of the Due Process Clause. The
impoverished nature of the doctrine is particularly striking
because in private civil lawsuits there is a well developed test
that courts have applied for decades to ensure that jurisdiction
over foreign defendants is legitimate. This is the "personal
jurisdiction" test, which attaches under the Due Process Clause.
Part II.B probes the reasons for the disconnect between the
civil and criminal jurisprudences. By embarking on a historical
survey of extraterritorial criminal statutes in the United States,
Part II.B demonstrates that the type of criminal statute that
raises due process concerns, such as the material support statute,
is a relatively recent phenomenon.
A. Principles
1. Civil Law and the Personal Jurisdiction Test
In the civil law context, the Due Process Clause plays a
prominent and familiar role in regulating the reach of the law
vis-a-vis outsiders. Tort, contract, and other civil liabilities
created by federal and state law do not just attach to anyone,
especially if those persons do not live within the relevant
community that created the law. The key requirement under the
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Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is notice. Through the Due
Process Clause's "personal jurisdiction" test, all courts in the
United States will insist that before a nonresident is held legally
accountable by a jurisdiction, he be afforded some type of notice
that his behavior will trigger legal consequences there.9' As the
Supreme Court put it in International Shoe v. Washington, civil
jurisdiction is proper over a defendant when "the quality and
nature of [his] activity" in relation to the forum renders such
jurisdiction consistent with "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.""
In general, federal and state courts have developed three
proxies for measuring whether a foreign defendant has been
provided sufficient notice in private civil cases. These tests apply
in matters that involve both intra-national foreigners-for
example, defendants who reside within the United States but
outside the state in which the litigation is pending-and
international foreigners-for example, defendants who live
outside the country entirely.
First, courts will look to whether the defendant was
physically present in the jurisdiction when he violated its law. If
so, courts will assume that fair warning was provided and that
personal jurisdiction is reasonable.97 For instance, if a defendant
set up a store in state X from which he sold defective products to
local customers, his physical presence in X would suffice as a
proxy for his notice that legal sanctions-should he violate the
law-would likely follow. In these cases, courts fall back on a
centuries-old, territorial concept of jurisdiction: the notion that
"full and absolute territorial jurisdiction" is an "attribute of every
sovereign."" As Chief Justice John Marshall put it in 1812,
When private individuals of one nation spread themselves
through another ... mingling indiscriminately with the
inhabitants of that other,. . . [it] would subject the laws to
6 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
96 Id. at 316, 319 (citation omitted).
" Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 610, 619 (1990) ("Among the
most firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction in American tradition is
that the courts of a State have jurisdiction over nonresidents who are physically
present in the State. . . . The short of the matter is that jurisdiction based on
physical presence alone constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing
traditions of our legal system that define the due process standard of 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.' ").
"I The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812).
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continual infraction, and the government to degradation, if such
individuals or merchants did not owe temporary and local
allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the
country.99
Second, courts will invoke the "minimum contacts" test as a
proxy for notice. If the defendant was not physically present in
the jurisdiction when he violated its law, but made a sufficient
number of contacts with the jurisdiction before the conduct in the
litigation arose, courts will also assume that notice was
afforded. 0 The defendant's minimum contacts in these cases
come to signify a quasi-membership status that he has assumed
in the community. Accordingly, courts will deem it reasonable to
hold the defendant accountable for failing to follow the
community's laws.'0 When courts apply the minimum contacts
test to cases involving foreigners, they look to whether the
foreigner had a sufficient number of contacts with the United
States as a whole. 02
Third, courts will use a "purposeful availment" test as a
proxy for notice. In these cases, where a defendant "purposefully
availed himself" of a jurisdiction's benefits in order to derive
some personal benefit-for instance, through carrying on
business activities that depended on the existence of the
jurisdiction's laws-courts will again infer that fair warning was
provided. 103
These three doctrines for regulating courts' personal
jurisdiction over out-of-jurisdiction defendants, especially
foreigners who were outside of the United States altogether when
they purportedly broke a state or federal law, have become
staples of private litigation.
9 Id. at 144; see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES
21 (8th ed. 1883).
100 Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319.
101 See id.
102 See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
(1984); Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1315 (9th Cir. 1985);
Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 314 (2d
Cir. 1981), overruled in part on other gruonds by Frontera Res. Azer. Corp. v. State
Oil Co. of the Azer. Republic, 582 F.3d 393 (2d. Cir. 2009).
'0e See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (holding that the Due
Process Clause test for personal jurisdiction is satisfied whenever there is "some act
by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws").
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2. Criminal Law Unbounded
The "personal jurisdiction" test that attaches in civil law
contexts does not carry over to the criminal context. When it
comes to the application of criminal law vis-bt-vis outsiders-
either those from outside the state, or those from outside the
United States altogether-the conventional account among
scholars, practitioners, and even judges is that the Due Process
Clause simply has less to say.'0 4  Granted, the Due Process
Clause protects a defendant's procedural rights during a criminal
trial, regardless of where he comes from.0" And criminal
defendants can move for changes of venue once they have been
indicted in state or federal court if the balance of equities or their
Sixth Amendment jury rights militate in favor of such.o But
there is no "personal jurisdiction" test that is routinely invoked to
judge, a priori, the fairness of convening a trial over an
extraterritorial defendant."0 ' Rather, in cases involving both
extra-state criminal jurisdiction and extraterritorial jurisdiction,
the conventional practice among judges has been to allow the
criminal trial to proceed, without subjecting it to a rigorous due
process test as a jurisdictional gatekeeper.108 There is a jarring
disconnect between civil and criminal case law.
104 See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
101 See Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 12, at 1219.
106 See Mortensen v. State, 217 S.W.2d 325, 328-29 (Ark. 1949) (involving venue
claims by the defendant).
10' Part of this is due to the fact that until recently, criminal defendants rarely
invoked the Due Process Clause to challenge the court's jurisdiction. Brilmayer &
Norchi, supra note 12, at 1219 ("[Allthough defendants faced with federal legislative
overreaching do raise arguments based upon international law, they rarely rely on
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the federal analog of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.").
10s In cases involving extra-state criminal jurisdiction, the only question courts
will ask is whether the defendant intended to cause effects in the state that is now
seeking to impose punishment. E.g., Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911);
U.S. ex rel. Pascarella v. Radakovich, 548 F. Supp. 125, 126-27 (N.D. Ill. 1982); West
v. State, 797 A.2d 1278, 1284 (Md. 2002); People v. Blume, 505 N.W.2d 843, 844
(Mich. 1993); Innis v. State, 69 P.3d 413, 417 (Wyo. 2003). However, courts apply
this test not under the mandate of the Due Process Clause but out of concerns for
states' sovereignty. See Strassheim, 221 U.S. at 285; MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(1)(f)
(2010) (providing that a state may take jurisdiction over conduct occurring outside
that state if it "bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest of th[e] State"). In
cases involving extraterritorial defendants, courts typically do not consult the Due
Process Clause to ensure that jurisdiction is legitimate, see infra notes 129-35 and
accompanying text, and where they do, it is in a pro-forma manner rather than in a
rigorous manner that approximates the civil jurisdiction test, see infra notes 143-48
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Focusing on prosecutions involving the extraterritorial
application of the American criminal law beyond our country's
borders, the subject of this Article, one sees that it is the
"Bowman doctrine" as opposed to the Due Process Clause that
has dominated the field for nearly a century. Let us pause to
review the facts of Bowman.
In 1922, the federal government charged three U.S. citizens
on board a ship with "hatching a plot" to defraud a corporation in
which the United States government held stock. 09 According to
the indictment, the defendants crafted their plan when the ship
was on the high seas, en route from the United States to
Brazil.110  The government charged the defendants with
conspiring to defraud the United States and the defendants
claimed that the statute, as a matter of interpretation, did not
reach their conduct. 1' The sole question before the Supreme
Court was as follows: Did the federal statute apply, given that
the defendants were outside of the United States when they
broke the law?112
The Court held for the government, concluding that the
statute reached the defendants' conduct aboard the ship.' On
the one hand, a common canon of construction at the time
instructed that courts refrain from giving laws extraterritorial
effect without a clear statement by Congress." 4 The criminal
statute in Bowman "contain[ed] no reference to the high seas as a
part of the locus of the offense defined by it," and so a straight
application of the presumption against extraterritoriality
suggested that the prosecution be dismissed.11 6 On the other
hand, the Supreme Court observed that crimes against the
government pose a distinct type of harm because they involve an
and accompanying text. The one outlier body of case law is the recent drug
trafficking cases in the Ninth Circuit, in which federal courts have grounded
extraterritorial jurisdiction in the Due Process Clause. See infra Part III.C.
109 United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 95 (1922).
110 Id.
n1 Id. at 96-97.
11 Id. at 97-98.
n1 Id. at 102.
n1 See, e.g., Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909),
overruled in part as stated in Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869,
2887 n. 11 (2010) (holding that "in case of doubt," a statute should be construed "to be
confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker
has general and legitimate power").
n" Bowman, 260 U.S. at 97.
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assault on the country's sovereign interests."6  Statutes
criminalizing such activity deserve a more liberal presumption
about their territorial reach. The Bowman Court stated,
Crimes against private individuals or their property, like
assaults, murder, burglary .. . which affect the peace and good
order of the community must, of course, be committed within
the territorial jurisdiction of the government where it may
properly exercise it.
But the same rule of interpretation should not be applied to
criminal statutes which are, as a class ... enacted because of
the right of the government to defend itself against obstruction,
or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if committed by its
own citizens, officers, or agents." 7
The Bowman Court concluded that the criminal conspiracy law
at issue should be read to apply to the high seas, and that the
prosecution should proceed."s
Bowman has been cited over 800 times."' But for many
courts and scholars, it has come to stand for a much broader
principle than was actually articulated in the opinion. The
technical holding of Bowman was rather narrow. The Court
announced a rule of statutory interpretation that would apply to
limited category of laws; namely, federal laws banning crimes
against the United States government would be spared the
presumption against extraterritorial effect.120  The opinion
contained no constitutional analysis,"' and the only defendants
in the case were American citizens."2 Over time, however,
116 Id. at 98-99.
n1 Id. at 98.
" Id. at 102-03.
n9 Citing References, WESTLAW, www.westlaw.com (search "260 U.S. 94" in
citation search; then follow "citing references" hyperlink on the left under "full
history") (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
120 See Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98. The Court has continued to apply the
presumption against extraterritorial effect to other categories of statutes. See, e.g.,
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173-74 (1993); EEOC v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 246-47 (1991); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-
85 (1949).
121 Bowman, 260 U.S. at 96-97 (stating that the defendants' "sole objection was
that the crime was committed without the jurisdiction of the United States or of any
state thereof" and accordingly, "[wle have in this case a question of statutory
construction").
122 There was a fourth defendant in Bowman-a British national-but he was
never apprehended. The Supreme Court was careful to note, at the end of its
opinion, that its holding should not be read to necessarily authorize jurisdiction over
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jurists and scholars have read Bowman as articulating a de facto
rule of constitutional law. They have read the case as
establishing that there is no constitutional bar on Congress from
passing criminal statutes that bear extraterritorial effect. 12 3
A recent decision in the Southern District of New York
exemplifies the broad reading of Bowman that many courts
and academics have rendered. In United States v. Manuel,
the United States charged a foreign citizen for conspiring to
import to and distribute illegal drugs in the United States, in
contravention of American criminal law.12 4  The defendant
allegedly transported ecstasy pills from Holland to Germany.12 5
The government presented "no evidence whatsoever" in its pre-
trial filings showing that the defendant ever knew or intended for
the eventual destination of the pills to be the United States.126
However, when the defense raised a constitutional challenge to
Congress's ability to subject him to legal sanction, the judge
rejected it, citing Bowman.127 "Any challenge to the legislative
jurisdiction of Congress must fail, since there is no constitutional
bar to the extraterritorial application of penal laws. Whether a
statute has such extraterritorial application is solely a question
of legislative intent."128
The Manuel opinion is illustrative of how courts have applied
Bowman in the years since it was decided. Just as the
court in that case read Bowman as implicitly endorsing, from
a constitutional standpoint, any extraterritorial crime that
Congress chooses to codify, federal courts have made similar
analytic moves in cases involving immigration offenses,129 sexual
that foreigner. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 102-03 ("The other defendant is a subject of
Great Britain. He has never been apprehended, and it will be time enough to
consider what, if any, jurisdiction the District Court below has to punish him when
he is brought to trial.").
123 See infra notes 127-35 and accompanying text.
124 371 F. Supp. 2d 404, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
121 Id. at 406.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 409.
128 Id. (citing United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97-98 (1922)).
129 See United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(acknowledging that whether a statute applies extraterritorially depends on
Congress's judgment and that the character of the criminal offense at issue, namely,
an immigration offense, suggested Congress meant to reach extraterritorial
conduct).
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130 fraud La132 an1mre 3 hcrimes,13 fraud laws,' terrorism crimes, and more. The
Supreme Court also began its opinion in a relatively recent
extraterritoriality case with the assumption that applying the
law abroad triggered no constitutional implications. It stated,
"Both parties concede, as they must, that Congress has the
authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of
the United States. Whether Congress has in fact exercised that
authority in these cases is a matter of statutory construction." 3 4
The Congressional Research Service sums up the case law as
follows: "[T]he courts fairly uniformly have held that questions
of extraterritoriality are almost exclusively within the discretion
of Congress . ... [T]he question of the extent to which a
particular statute applies outside the United States has
generally been considered a matter of statutory, rather than
constitutional, construction."35
oo See United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1230 (11th Cir. 2010) ("Congress
has the power to apply its laws extraterritorially, but whether it has done so is a
matter of statutory construction that is subject to plenary review.... We have
interpreted Bowman to hold that extraterritorial application 'may be inferred from
the nature of the offense[I and Congress's other legislative efforts to eliminate the
type of crime involved.'" (alteration in original)); United States v. Martinez, 599 F.
Supp. 2d 784, 796-98 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (holding that the Constitution does not bar
Congress from the "extraterritorial application of the United States penal laws" and
citing Bowman for the proposition that to determine whether a law applies
extraterritorially, a court need look only to congressional intent). To date, cases
involving the extraterritorial application of federal sex crime laws have all involved
defendants who were U.S. citizens acting abroad. Nonetheless, these cases are
instructive because they illustrate courts' expansive readings of Bowman.
13' See United States v. Birch, 470 F.2d 808, 811 (4th Cir. 1972) (holding that
"United States v. Bowman ... states the rule for determining whether a criminal law
should be given extraterritorial effect" and under Bowman, the statute criminalizing
the counterfeit use of military passes applied abroad).
132 See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 903 (D.D.C. 1988) ("The
reliance that Yunis' counsel places on United States v. Bowman to argue that
Congress has no power to extend jurisdiction outside its territorial boundaries, is
misplaced. Bowman stands for the contrary proposition. Indeed, it is routinely
quoted for the holding that 'there is no constitutional bar to the extraterritorial
application of penal laws.'" (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. King, 552
F.2d 833, 850 (9th Cir. 1976)).
133 E.g., United States v. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d 1200, 1204 (9th Cir. 1991)
(involving the kidnapping and murder of a DEA agent in Mexico, and holding that
"[glenerally, there is no constitutional bar to the extraterritorial application of
United States penal laws. Courts look to congressional intent, express or implied, to
determine whether a given statute should have extraterritorial application."
(citations omitted)).
1a EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (citations omitted).
135 CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION
OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 8 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
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Moreover, it is not just federal courts that treat Bowman
and its progeny as implicitly ratifying jurisdiction over
extraterritorial crimes from a constitutional standpoint. Law
treatises have reasoned this way as well.13 6 Some decline to even
list the Constitution as a relevant concern when discussing
whether criminal statutes should be construed as reaching
foreigners' conduct abroad. 1 3  One treatise writes: "The
threshold question in cases in which federal authorities seek
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction is whether Congress
intended the extraterritorial application of the statute that
proscribes the conduct alleged. The second phase of the analysis
considers whether the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is
consistent with international law."138
In the legal scholarship, there is also little mention of any
constitutional barrier to Congress's extension of the criminal law
overseas. The weight of opinion is that Congress has relatively
free rein. According to Curtis Bradley, Congress enjoys "broad
authority to regulate extraterritorial conduct, and any due
process limitations on such regulation are likely to be weak at
best."139 Arthur Mark Weisburd argues that to impose due
process limitations on extraterritorial laws would be doubly
flawed: It would "necessarily amount to limiting the discretion of
Congress" in contravention of Article I, and it would give "aliens
outside the United States" Fifth Amendment rights they do not
enjoy.140 William Dodge advocates for "judicial unilateralism"
when courts determine whether a criminal statute applies
overseas, and fails to list the due process implications for
94-166.pdf; see also Ellen S. Podgor & Daniel M. Filler, International Criminal
Jurisdiction in the Twenty-First Century: Rediscovering United States v. Bowman,
44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 585, 592 (2007) (criticizing lower courts' expansive reading of
the Supreme Court's decision in Bowman).
136 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 403 cmt. f (1987) (explaining that extraterritorial application of criminal
laws depends on legislative intent).
13' E.g., 8A Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 22:47 (2011) (describing congressional intent as
the touchstone to identifying whether a statute may be applied extraterritorially and
declining to address constitutional considerations).
.. Brian L. Porto, Annotation, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts, 1 A.L.R. FED. 2d 415 (2005).
139 Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 323, 341.
140 A. Mark Weisburd, Due Process Limits on Federal Extraterritorial
Legislation?, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 379, 405 (1997).
ST JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
foreigners as a relevant factor. 141 Scholars with less opinionated
views than Bradley, Weisburd, or Dodge still agree that at least
as a matter of the governing case law, "Congress could extend its
laws as far as it likes" because the Supreme Court has set no
clear limits on such activity under the Due Process Clause or
otherwise.142
Granted, the assumption that the Constitution implicitly
endorses all extraterritorial criminal lawmaking is not
universally shared. Especially in the past five to ten years,
courts have begun to reason that despite the Supreme Court's
failure to say so in Bowman or in subsequent cases, the Due
Process Clause does put a backstop to Congress's extension of
United States criminal law overseas. The Ninth Circuit of the
United States Court of Appeals has led the way in its
adjudication of drug trafficking. In the 1991 case of United
States v. Larsen, the Ninth Circuit began its analysis by stating
that "Congress is empowered to attach extraterritorial effect to
its penal statutes so long as the statute does not violate the [D]ue
[Pirocess [Cilause of the Fifth Amendment."143 Since that case,
courts in the Ninth Circuit regularly cite the Due Process Clause
at the outset of their opinions when confronted with
141 William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An
Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 101, 104-05 (1998) ("Thus,
I argue that a court should apply a statute extraterritorially whenever doing so
appears to advance the purposes of the statute and should not worry about resolving
conflicts ofjurisdiction with other nations.").
142 John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT'L
L. 351, 351 (2010); see also Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 12, at 1219 n.12
(observing that none of the "leading federal extraterritoriality cases .. . treat due
process as a serious issue"); Ellen S. Podgor, "Defensive Territoriality": A New
Paradigm for the Prosecution of Extraterritorial Business Crimes, 31 GA. J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 1, 11-12 (2002) ("When Congress does not mention extraterritoriality in
the statute, as is the case in the majority of criminal statutes, courts are left to
resolve the issue of whether the extraterritorial application should be allowed.
Courts approach this issue by trying to discern the intent of Congress, looking to
whether jurisdiction is authorized under the international bases of jurisdiction, or by
using an approach that combines an examination of congressional intent and
international law.").
'- 952 F.2d 1099, 1100 (9th Cir. 1991). The reasoning in Larsen was based on
that in United States v. Davis, decided the year before. 905 F.2d 245, 248-49 (9th
Cir. 1990) ("In order to apply extraterritorially a federal criminal statute to a
defendant consistently with due process, there must be a sufficient nexus between
the defendant and the United States so that such application would not be arbitrary
or fundamentally unfair.") (citation ommited).
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extraterritorial prosecutions for drug trafficking.'" Moreover, in
recent years, district and appellate courts in other circuits have
begun to make reference to the Fifth Amendment in
extraterritoriality cases." But the fact is, the lion's share of the
courts that acknowledge the Due Process Clause in their opinions
"do little more than note that due process restrictions mark the
frontier of the authority to enact and enforce American law
abroad."146  They treat due process more as a formality to be
mentioned at the beginning of an opinion than as a real
constraint on Congress's powers.147  United States v. Al Kassar,
for instance, discussed in Part I.B above, was a case which
technically cited the Due Process Clause with respect to
jurisdiction, but lacked any true discussion about the case's
complicated notice issues.148  After an extensive search, the
author of this Article could find only one case to date in which a
federal court at either the district or appellate level has struck
down an extraterritorial application of a federal criminal law
under the Due Process Clause.4 9
" E.g., United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 722 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d 819, 827 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Klimavicius-
Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1257 (9th Cir. 1998).
14 Courts in seven circuits have by now stated that the Due Process Clause
regulates in extraterritorial drug trafficking cases. See infra note 297 and
accompanying text. Some courts have also begun to reference the Due Process
Clause in extraterritorial prosecutions for other crimes, such as for terrorism-for
example, United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 86 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v.
Reumayr, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1223 (D.N.M. 2008); United States v. Yousef, No. S3
08 Cr. 1213(JFK), 2010 WL 3377499, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2010); and United
States v. Al Kassar, 582 F. Supp. 2d 488, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)-smuggling-for
example, United States v. Yeh Hsin-Yung, 97 F. Supp. 2d 24, 27 (D.D.C. 2000)
(holding that "the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over the defendant" must
be "consistent with the dictates of due process")-or simple crimes conducted by U.S.
contractors or employees abroad-for example, United States v. Campbell, 798 F.
Supp. 2d 293, 296 (D.D.C. 2011) (bribery conducted by a construction manager in
Afghanistan working on a contract from USAID); United States v. Brehm, No. 1:11-
cr-11, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33903, at *1, 11-12 (E.D. Va. Mar. 30, 2011) (assault
conducted by a United States contractor abroad); and United States v. Ayesh, 762 F.
Supp. 2d 832, 834, 841-42 (E.D. Va. 2011) (embezzlement by an employee of a U.S.
embassy in Iraq).
*4 DOYLE, supra note 135, at 5; see also infra notes 299-305 (explaining how the
due process tests in all circuits except for the Ninth, in extraterritorial drug
trafficking cases, lack teeth).
14 See Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 12, at 1219 n.12.
148 See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
4 That case was United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1161-62 (9th Cir.
2006). See also Yousef, 2010 WL 3377499, at *3 n.1 ("The Court is not aware of any
case in which a federal court has dismissed an action on the ground that the
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Thus, while courts are beginning to give lip service to Due
Process Clause doctrine in some cases involving extraterritorial
criminal jurisdiction, the doctrine, on the whole, is still missing
in action.
B. History
This section seeks to use a historical analysis to account for
the underdevelopment of a due process test and the dominance of
the Bowman doctrine in extraterritorial criminal cases. Have
courts, and legal scholars, for that matter, simply been blind to
the potential fairness problems that inhere when foreigners
acting abroad are prosecuted under American criminal law? Has
everyone been asleep at the wheel? This Section argues
otherwise. It shows that, instead, the reason courts have not
developed a robust due process test to assess the extraterritorial
application of the criminal law in the terrorism cases and beyond
is that, for most of United States history, courts have not needed
such a test.
The key point made below is that extraterritorial criminal
statutes of the type seen today, under which conduct abroad can
make a person guilty in the United States whenever Congress
prescribes, are latecomers to the American legal system. This
type of statute is, in fact, only about thirty years old. At the
founding of the United States, crime and punishment had been a
highly local affair. The Framers thought it only natural that
"[t] he Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be held in the State where the
said Crimes shall have been committed."50 Criminal law applied
within set territorial areas, and only persons within those
boundaries were obliged to comply. For the next two hundred
years, this description continued to capture the lion's share of
criminal cases. The Supreme Court declared in 1909, "[T]he
general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act
as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of
the country where the act is done."1 5'
extraterritorial application of a federal statue violates the Due Process Clause.");
Reumayr, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 1223 ("[Ilt appears that no federal court has
invalidated the extraterritorial application of U.S. law on due process grounds.").
o50 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
151 Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909), overruled in
part as stated in Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2887 n.11
(2010).
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Parts II.B.1 and II.B.2 below show that from the Founding
through 1980, there were only two types of situations in which
the federal government sought to impose criminal punishment on
foreign citizens for their conduct abroad. The first was when the
offender committed a "universal crime" that Congress codified in
a statute. The second was when an offender perpetrated a
conventional crime, such as murder or embezzlement, but
directly against the United States government. Both categories
of extraterritorial jurisdiction were relatively uncontroversial
because both were based on activities that the defendant should
have known could trigger punishment in the United States. It is
not surprising that courts failed to develop due process tests for
taking extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction during these years;
the cases themselves did not present due process difficulties.
The landscape changed in 1980. As Part II.B.3 below shows,
1980 marked the first time in which Congress passed a criminal
law-the Marijuana on the High Seas Act-that not only bore
extraterritorial effect but also outlawed a form of conduct which
foreigners might not have expected to carry punitive
consequences. This Act marked the birth of the modern
extraterritorial criminal statute. Since 1980, Congress has
passed additional laws of this variety, primarily in the terrorism
area. The problem is that courts have yet to develop a doctrinal
framework to measure the legitimacy of these laws under Fifth
Amendment principles.
1. Universal Crimes
The first category of crimes over which the United States has
long sought to impose extraterritorial jurisdiction consists of
"universal crimes." According to international law, some offenses
are considered so heinous and offensive to all of mankind that
any state would be justified in imposing punishment, no matter
who the perpetrator or where the site of conduct." 2 These are
"universal crimes." Offenses come to be regarded as "universal"
through the development of customary international law and
practice, or through the passage of multilateral treaties and
152 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 404 (1987) ("A [sovereign] state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment
for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal
concern . .. even where none of the bases of jurisdiction indicated in § 402 is
present.").
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international agreements. 5 3  There is widespread consensus
among jurists and scholars today that piracy, slave trading,
genocide, and war crimes are all examples of universal crimes.154
Since the early days of the American republic, federal courts
have adjudicated extraterritorial piracy cases."' The practice
appears to date back to the Articles of Confederation,15 6 and it
was explicitly written into the Constitution. Under Article I, the
framers authorized Congress to "define and punish Piracies and
Felonies committed on the high Seas,"'5 7 an area categorically
outside of United States borders, and under Article III they
endowed the federal judiciary with appropriate jurisdiction over
such cases. 5 8 As early as 1819, Congress invoked its authority
under the Define and Punish Clause and made it a federal crime
to commit piracy, "as defined by the law of nations," anywhere on
the high seas.'59 As early as 1820, the Supreme Court upheld the
application of the 1819 statute to a British citizen who committed
robbery aboard a Spanish ship.o6  Although the defendant
claimed that his prosecution was unfair and denied him fair
M See id. § 404 cmt. a (explaining that universal crimes can develop via
customary international law, or as "a result of universal condemnation of those
activities and general interest in cooperating to suppress them, as reflected in
widely-accepted international agreements and resolutions of international
organizations").
14 Id. § 404; see also id. § 404 reporter's n.1 (suggesting that torture, apartheid,
aircraft hijacking, and hostage-taking qualify as universal crimes as well, given that
those acts are now banned by widely-signed treaties).
"' See Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66
TEX. L. REV. 785, 791 (1988).
156 Under Article 9 of the Articles of Confederation, officially ratified in 1781,
Congress was given "the sole and exclusive right ... [of] appointing courts for the
trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas and establishing courts for
receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases of captures." ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 1.
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (emphasis added).
118 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (authorizing the federal judiciary to hear all
cases "arising under" federal law or treaties).
"' The Act provided
[t]hat if any person or persons whatsoever, shall, on the high seas, commit
the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations, and such offender or
offenders, shall afterwards be brought into or found in the United States,
every such offender ... shall, upon conviction thereof, before the circuit
court of the United States for the district into which he or they may be
brought, or in which he or they shall be found, be punished with death.
Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513-14. This Act is today codified in
modified form at 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006) ("Whoever, on the high seas, commits the
crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations ... shall be imprisoned for life.").
16 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 154-55, 163 (1820).
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warning, the Supreme Court disagreed. 61  It consulted the
writings of Hugo Grotius, Domenico Alberto Azuni, and other
international law scholars to conclude that piracy under the law
of nations had an amply "certain" definition. 6 2 Any man in
Smith's position should have known what was prohibited and
should have expected punishment somewhere. The United
States' prosecution was constitutional and consistent with
international law.163
In addition to piracy, a second universal crime over which
the United States has long exerted extraterritorial jurisdiction is
slave trading. In the early nineteenth century, Congress took a
more restricted approach to slave traders, declaring their conduct
criminal only in the case of United States citizens or persons
aboard American-owned ships." In a notable 1825 case, the
Supreme Court refused to treat Spanish and Portuguese slave
traders as guilty of a criminal violation because those foreigners
did not fall under United States law at the time."' But in the
1840s, the United States shifted gears. It signed bilateral
treaties with European countries in which it declared slave
161 See id. at 156-62.
162 Id. at 154, 160-62, 163 n.h (holding that "the crime of piracy is defined by the
law of nations with reasonable certainty" and "[tihere is scarcely a writer on the law
of nations[] who does not allude to piracy as a crime of a settled and determinate
nature").
163 Id. at 162. The Supreme Court reiterated this position in another case
decided the same year. See United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. 184, 197 (1820)
("Robbery on the seas is considered as an offence within the criminal jurisdiction of
all nations. It is against all, and punished by all. . . ."). Judge Moore from the
Permanent Court of International Justice issued an often-cited dissenting opinion in
S.S. Lotus that supports the Supreme Court's holdings in Smith and Furlong that
piracy was a universally cognizable crime in the early 1800s. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v.
Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 70 (Sept. 7) (J. Moore, dissenting)
("Piracy by law of nations ... is an offence against the law of nations; and as the
scene of the pirate's operations is the high seas, which it is not the right or duty of
any nation to police, he is denied the protection of the flag which he may carry, and
is treated as an outlaw, as the enemy of all mankind-hostis humani generis-whom
any nation may in the interest of all capture and punish.").
'" Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 113, §§ 4-5, 3 Stat. 600, 600-01 (declaring that "any
citizen of the United States" or "any person whatever" who served on a slave ship
owned by a United States citizen would be "adjudged a pirate" and "suffer death").
165 The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 114-15, 121-23, 131-32 (1825) (holding that slaves
that had been seized by the United States from Spanish and Portuguese ships off the
African Coast had to be returned to those countries because, although the United
States sought freedom for the slaves and claimed that slave-trading violated law of
nations, many nations still sanctioned the practice).
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trading to be equivalent to piracy.16  These treaties announced
that both parties would collaborate in prosecuting slave traders,
regardless of their citizenship or the site of their conduct.16 1 In
1919 and 1926, the United States signed multilateral agreements
that also pledged collective action in ending slave trading
throughout the globe.168
Finally, in the 1970s, the United States broadened its
extraterritorial jurisdiction over universal crimes by bringing
certain acts of terrorism within its reach. As the Cold War
deepened in the 1960s and militant groups began to gain access
to increasingly violent technologies, the international community
passed a slew of conventions aimed at suppressing terroristic
conduct. These treaties denounced aircraft hijacking, 69 hostage
taking,170 crimes against diplomatic agents,"' and extortion 72 as
globally condemned offenses. They obliged signatory parties to
not only outlaw the activities domestically but to collaborate in
bringing perpetrators from other jurisdictions to justice. 7 3 After
ratifying these anti-terrorism treaties, the United States passed
the Antihijacking Act of 1974174 and the Comprehensive Crime
16 Treaty for the Suppression of the African Slave Trade, Austria-Gr. Brit.-
Prussia-Russ., art. I, Dec. 20, 1841, reprinted in 92 THE CONSOLIDATED TREATY
SERIES 437, 441 (Clive Parry ed., ann., 1969).
167 Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction's
Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 183, 194 n.60 (2004).
168 Convention Revising the General Act of Berlin, February 26, 1885, and of the
General Act and the Declaration of Brussels, July 2, 1890 art. 11, Sept. 10, 1919, 8
L.N.T.S. 27, available at http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/LNTSer/1922/19.html;
Convention on Slavery arts. 2 & 5, Sept. 25, 1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 253 (1926), available
at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/slavery.htm.
16 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641; Convention on Offenses and
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941.
' International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 21, 1979,
1316 U.N.T.S. 205.
171 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, adopted Dec. 14,
1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975.
172 Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of
Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that Are of International
Significance, Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949.
17s Colangelo, supra note 6, at 179.
174 Antihijacking Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-366, § 103, 88 Stat. 409
(1974) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 46502 (2006)).
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Control Act of 1984,17s to ensure the treaties had domestic effect.
The 1974 statute applied to aircraft hijackers, the 1984 statute
applied to hostage-takers, and both announced that offenders
would be subject to criminal punishment in the United States, no
matter where they perpetrated their conduct or who had been the
victims. 176  In 1994, the United States also assumed universal
jurisdiction over torture,"' and it has prosecuted one case of
torture under that statute to date.7
Nonetheless, despite its posture towards piracy, slave
trading, and certain acts of terrorism and torture, the United
States has not assumed extraterritorial jurisdiction over all
universal crimes. Most notably, it has refrained from doing so for
war crimes or for genocide. Under the Geneva Conventions of
1949, the international community made the willful imposition of
"grave suffering," "inhumane treatment," and other wartime acts
universally punishable offenses.179  However, the United States,
to date, has still only assumed criminal jurisdiction over war
crimes when the perpetrator or the victim is a United States
national; it does not seek to hold foreign offenders overseas
responsible in U.S. courts unless their target was an American. 80
"1 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 2002(a), 98
Stat. 1976 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(1)(B) (2006))
176 See 49 U.S.C. § 46502 (2006) (declaring that any aircraft-hijacker "afterwards
found in the United States" could be prosecuted); 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (2006)
(authorizing U.S. jurisdiction over any hostage-taker "found in the United States").
n7 Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 506, 108
Stat. 382 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2006)) ("Whoever outside the United States
commits or attempts to commit torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than 20 years, or both, and if death results to any person from conduct
prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term
of years or for life. . . . There is jurisdiction over the activity . .. if. . . the alleged
offender is present in the United States, irrespective of the nationality of the victim or
alleged offender.") (emphasis added).
I" See United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 793 (11th Cir. 2010) (upholding
the jury's verdict and the court's imposition of a ninety-seven-year sentence against
Charles Taylor II under the 1994 Torture Statute for various atrocities he committed
in Liberia between 1999 and 2003). The case was only quasi-extraterritorial because
Taylor was actually an American citizen, born in Massachusetts in 1977, so the
application of the Torture Statute to his case was not on a wholly extraterritorial
basis. Id.
179 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War arts. 146-47, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 (outlawing the act of willfully
causing grave suffering); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War art. 130, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316 (outlawing inhumane treatment).
180 18 U.S.C. § 2441(b) (2006) (requiring that, for a criminal penalty to be
imposed, "the person committing such war crime or the victim of such war crime
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Similarly, although genocide has been globally outlawed since
1948,181 the United States also has limited its genocide law-
jurisdiction only lies where the offense is "committed within the
United States" or the offender is a "national of the United
States."8 2 Thus, while the United States has a long history of
assuming extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain universal
crimes, and while the Supreme Court has endorsed the practice
since 1820, universal jurisdiction is still only selectively
established by Congress for particular types of conduct.
2. Crimes Against the Sovereign
In addition to universal crimes, there is a second class of
criminal conduct over which United States courts have for
decades taken extraterritorial jurisdiction: crimes against the
sovereign. In such cases, the defendant commits an act that is
not only illegal under United States law, such as the crime of
murder or forgery, but that involves-either as an element of the
offense or as a key part of the charge-the intentional infliction
of harm against the United States and its sovereign concerns.
For instance, the murder of a Drug Enforcement Administration
("DEA") agent,183 the assault of a United States Congressman,18 4
or the embezzlement of governmental monies,' 5 would qualify.
These cases involve the intentional infliction of harm by a
foreigner on the United States, its officials, or its core
governmental functions.
Foreigners have regularly been prosecuted for committing
crimes against the sovereign since the 1960s. Bowman, decided
in 1922, was a case of this variety, but because the defendants in
[must be] a member of the Armed Forces of the United States or a national of the
United States"). The offense of "war crime" is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c), and
includes "a grave breach in any of the international conventions signed at Geneva 12
August 1949."
181 E.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
art. I, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
182 18 U.S.C. § 1091(d) (2006).
183 United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1984).
18' United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (involving the
murder of a Congressman in Guyana).
185 E.g., United States v. Hijazi, No. 05-40024-02, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77347,
at *22 (C.D. IlL. July 18, 2011) (describing a prosecution for theft from the U.S.
treasury as follows: "This is not a case in which the United States is attempting to
prosecute a foreign national for an act taken against a U.S. citizen, or even a U.S.
corporation, it is attempting to prosecute Hijazi for actions that were taken against
the United States itself.").
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the case were actually United States citizens, it is not an
example of extraterritorial jurisdiction being applied in its fullest
sense. In the decades following Bowman, there are numerous
examples of courts taking pure extraterritorial jurisdiction-
allowing prosecutions against foreigners for conduct perpetrated
abroad-when the offenses were of the Bowman variety.186  To
name a few examples, courts sustained extraterritorial
jurisdiction in cases involving the submission of false documents
to a consular official overseas;187 the forging of U.S. treasury
checks at a bank abroad;' 8 activities undertaken in Jamaica to
smuggle illegal aliens into the United States; 89 lying to the
federal government;19 0 and the attempted murder of a U.S. law
enforcement official in Colombia.'9'
In all of these cases, the courts found that assuming
extraterritorial jurisdiction was appropriate because the
defendant had purposefully targeted a sovereign interest of the
United States. The judges did not invoke the Due Process Clause
to ground their analyses, but instead looked to Bowman for its
rules of statutory interpretation and to international law for its
principles of sovereign jurisdiction.'92 Both doctrines, courts
186 See United States v. Ayesh, 762 F. Supp. 2d 832, 839-40 (E.D. Va. 2011)
("Cases following Bowman have consistently found the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction appropriate for statutes targeting crimes primarily involving
government personnel or assets because, consistent with Bowman, the nature of the
offenses targeted makes the presumption against extraterritorial jurisdiction
inappropriate.").
1" United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 8-9 (2d Cir. 1968) (involving a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546, under which it is crime to give false statements of
"material fact" on a visa application, at a consulate in Canada); Rocha v. United
States, 288 F.2d 545, 546, 548 (9th Cir. 1961) (also involving a violation of § 1546,
but in Mexico).
18 United States v. Fernandez, 496 F.2d 1294, 1295 (5th Cir. 1974).
188 United States v. Williams, 464 F.2d 599, 600 (2d Cir. 1972). The law that the
defendants were convicted of violating creates criminal penalties for anyone who
"knowing that a person is an alien, brings to or attempts to bring to the United
States in any manner whatsoever such person at a place other than a designated
port of entry." 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
190 United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1366
(S.D. Fla. 1998) (giving extraterritorial effect to 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and noting that
"contending a due process violation by a statute ... which criminalizes the
inherently bad conduct of lying to the government about something important, is
unconvincing").
18 United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 1984).
192 See id. at 1371 n.1; Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d at 8 n.2; Rocha, 288 F.2d at 548-49;
United States v. Hijazi, No. 05-40024-02, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77347, at *28-29
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found, supported the taking of jurisdiction. In Rocha v. United
States, for example, the United States indicted a group of
foreigners for entering into sham marriages in Mexico and
thereby violating the American immigration code.193 The Ninth
Circuit held that subjecting the defendants to a criminal trial in
the United States would be legitimate both under Bowman and
under international law. The court reasoned,
This brings us to the point-can United States law have
extra territorial jurisdiction? Or, more specifically as put to us
by the appellants-does the district court have jurisdiction to
indict and try an alien found within the court's jurisdiction for a
crime committed abroad?
[Analogizing the case to Bowman, we] see no reason why an
alien . .. should be placed in a more favorable position with
respect to his actions taken against the sovereignty of the
United States while he was abroad, than a United States citizen
would be.
The acts done to violate 1546 of Title 18 were all done outside
the state, but they were intended (at least at the point of time
when the fraudulent document was used to gain entry) to
produce, and they did so produce, a detrimental effect on the
sovereignty of the United States. Thus under "the protective
principle," less well known than "the territorial principle," yet
"claimed by most states," there is, and should be, jurisdiction. A
sovereign state must be able to protect itself from those who
attack its sovereignty. 194
Similarly, in cases involving the smuggling of aliens or the
forging of U.S. treasury checks overseas, courts concluded that
extraterritorial jurisdiction was justified because the defendants'
acts "were designed to have and were proved to have had in fact,
an adverse effect upon a governmental function of the United
States."9
On several occasions, courts denied assuming extraterritorial
jurisdiction precisely because the criminal indictment did not
involve allegations of the defendant's intent to harma United
(C.D. Ill. July 18, 2011); United States v. Ayesh, 762 F. Supp. 2d 832, 838 (E.D. Va.
2011).
' Rocha, 288 F.2d at 546.
194 Id. at 548-49.
195 United States v. Williams, 464 F.2d 599, 601 (2d Cir. 1972).
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States sovereign interest.'96  The case of United States v.
Columba-Colella'"' is illustrative. There, the Fifth Circuit held
that a statute making it a crime to receive a stolen car could not
be construed to apply extraterritorially to Mexico.'9 8 Unlike
cases where "the alien intended to and did directly interfere with
one of the functions of the United States government[,] . .. here
there was no interference with a governmental function."'99 The
court recognized that a person who receives a stolen car in
Mexico will "somehow affect[]" a United States citizen by
preventing him from using his property.2 00 "But that an act
affects the citizen of a state is not a sufficient basis for that state
to assert jurisdiction over the act."20'
In both the universal crimes and crimes-against-the-
sovereign cases, courts for the most part did not refer to the Due
Process Clause during their analyses about the legitimacy of
imposing extraterritorial accountability. However, the lack of
such analysis was not fatal because due process was not an issue
to begin with. Universal crimes are by definition egregious acts
that are condemned everywhere. Crimes against the sovereign
are by definition acts that involve the intent to harm the United
States and its governmental persons or functions. Accordingly,
perpetrators of either type of conduct should expect that they
could be haled into a United States court to account for their
activity. The universality of the crime in the first case, and the
intentional direction of the crime towards the United States in
the second, operates as an implicit proxy for notice.
196 See, e.g., United States v. Mann, 615 F.2d 668, 671 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding
that unlawfully carrying a firearm in the course of a felony, prohibited under
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), did not apply extraterritorially to foreigners on the high seas);
United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 358-59 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that
the federal crime of receiving stolen property was not applicable to a British citizen's
acts in Mexico); United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340, 1341, 1345
(S.D. Fla. 1981) (holding that the federal crime of possession of marijuana with
intent to deliver was not applicable to Colombian citizens' possession of narcotics on
a ship 400 miles from the United States border, lest the government could
demonstrate they harbored intent to import the drugs into the United States).
197 604 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1979).
198 Id. at 360.
199 Id. at 359.
200 Id. at 360.
201 Id.
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3. The Birth of the Modern Extraterritorial Criminal Statute
Up through the late 1970s, universal crimes and crimes
against the sovereign remained the only two categories of
criminal activity over which the United States sought to assume
extraterritorial jurisdiction. For its other penal statutes, the
United States did not seek enforcement overseas. As late as
1958, a law review article summarized the state of the federal
criminal law as follows: "[Als to acts taking place abroad,
the ... law is only available against those owing allegiance to the
United States on grounds of nationality or citizenship."20 2
This all changed in 1980 when Congress passed the
Marijuana on the High Seas Act.2 03 Under subsection (a) of the
statute, which applied to any person "on the high seas," it was
unlawful "to possess with intent to manufacture or distribute, a
controlled substance."2 0 4 Under subsection (d), which applied to
"any person," it was unlawful "to possess, manufacture, or
distribute a controlled substance-(1) intending that it be
unlawfully imported into the United States; or (2) knowing that
it will be unlawfully imported into the United States."20 5
Although subsection (d) did not include a specific location to
which it extended, it certainly applied at least as far as the high
seas. 206  The high seas are categorically beyond United States
territorial waters.207
The legislative history of the Marijuana on the High Seas
Act shows that it had one key purpose: ensuring that foreigners,
captured on boats beyond United States territory and in
possession of a substantial amount of drugs, could be made to
202 Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction over Foreigners for Treason
and Offenses Against the Safety of the State Committed upon Foreign Territory, 19 U.
PITr. L. REV. 567, 577 (1958).
203 Pub. L. No. 96-350, 94 Stat. 1159 (1980).
2" Id. § (a).
205 Id. § (d).
206 A catch-all provision stated that the entire Act was intended to have
extraterritorial effect. Id. § (h) ("This section is intended to reach acts of possession,
manufacture, or distribution committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States."). Accordingly, section (d) certainly applied beyond United States
borders; the question is whether it applied as far as the "high seas," as section (a)
had done, or perhaps even further. The most likely construction is that (d) reached
the high seas, an area beyond the control of any nation. There is no indication in the
statute's text or legislative history that it was intended to apply within other
sovereign nations' territories.
207 See Convention on the High Seas art. 6, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11.
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stand trial in United States courts. Under the relevant federal
statute at the time, drug trafficking was not an extraterritorial
crime.2 08 Prosecutors could only charge foreigners acting beyond
United States borders with the crime of conspiracy to traffic in
illicit drugs, and proving such a charge required evidence of two
things: first, overt acts taken by co-conspirators within the
United States-meaning at least part of the crime had to have
occurred within the United States-and second, the specific
intent of the defendant to import into the United States. 209
Officials from the Florida United States Attorney's office
complained to Congress in 1979 about the high evidentiary bars
they faced under that law. 2 10 They related that the office had
begun "just declining on those cases where experience taught us
we were not going to be able to proceed with a successful
prosecution."2 1 1 An official from the DEA similarly testified
about the "loophole [s] by which traffickers are circumventing
prosecution in the United States."212 Proving overt acts by co-
conspirators within the United States, and proving specific intent
of the defendant to target U.S. markets, were steep evidentiary
208 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-513, § 401(a)(1), 84 Stat. 1236, 1260 (stating that it shall be "unlawful for any
person knowingly or intentionally ... to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or
possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance,"
but not specifying that the Act applied abroad).
20 E.g., United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1256-58 (5th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 977-80 (5th Cir. 1975); Rivard v. United
States, 375 F.2d 882, 883-86 (5th Cir. 1967). Some courts had begun to loosen the
overt act requirement at the end of the decade, allowing jurisdiction over foreign
defendants under § 841(a) as long as the defendant showed a clear intent to
penetrate the United States. E.g., United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 138 (5th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Williams, 589 F.2d 210, 213 (5th Cir. 1979), affd on
reh'g 617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252, 1257
(S.D.N.Y 1980). But this was a new trend in the circuits, and it was judicially, as
opposed to congressionally, constructed. See M. Lawrence Noyer, Note, High Seas
Narcotics Smuggling and Section 955a of Title 21: Overextension of the Protective
Principle of International Jurisdiction, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 688, 708 (1982).
210 Coast Guard Drug Law Enforcement: Hearings on H.R. 2538 Before the
Subcomm. on Coast Guard & Navigation of the Comm. on Merch. Marines &
Fisheries, 96th Cong. 61 (1980) (statement of Michael P. Sullivan, Assistant U.S.
Attorney for the Southern District of Florida).
211 Id.
212 Id. at 48 (statement of Peter B. Bensinger, Administrator, Drug Enforcement
Administration).
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bars. The DEA official urged that the United States code be
changed, so that it would become a crime for anyone "to possess
large quantities of drugs on-board [a ship],"213 ipso facto.
Congress heeded the calls. As a Senate report accompanying
the Marijuana on the High Seas Act explained, the law was
designed to fix "th[e] statutory void which does not proscribe
possession of controlled substances on the high seas, while such
conduct is a crime in U.S. territory."2 14 Accordingly, subsection
(a) criminalized the possession with intent to distribute,
subsection (d) criminalized possession with intent to import into
the United States, and both provisions applied at least as far as
the high seas.2 15 A report prepared by the House clarified that
intent under the statute-including under subsection (d)-may
be "inferred by proof of a presence of a large quantity of the
216~ tenarcotic" within the defendant's possession. In other words, no
overt acts within the United States were necessary, nor did the
prosecutor need to prove that the defendant specifically intended
to make sales in the United States. 2 17 As one of the sponsors of
the bill in the House explained on the floor, "[T]his bill
essentially requires only knowledge or intent to distribute [in
general] with no need to establish a U.S. destination."2 18
The Marijuana on the High Seas Act of 1980 was path-
breaking. It was the first criminal statute to explicitly apply
extraterritorially, while punishing a form of conduct that was
neither cognizable under international law, nor that involved the
direct infliction of harm on a United States sovereign interest,
such as a government official or operation.2 19 Many key players
213 Id.
214 S. REP. NO. 96-855, at 1 (1980).
215 See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
216 H.R. REP. No. 96-323, at 10 (1979).
217 125 CONG. REC. 20,082-83 (July 23, 1979) (statement of Rep. Biaggi); see also
United States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363, 372 (4th Cir. 1982) ("Prosecutions for
possession of controlled substances prior to the enactment of the Marijuana on the
High Seas Act required proof of intent to distribute the illegal drugs within the
United States. The very intent of the Marijuana on the High Seas Act was to
eliminate that requirement and to facilitate prosecution of smugglers both native
and foreign who were apprehended on the high seas.").
218 Id. at 20,083 (statement of Rep. McCloskey).
219 That the Act reached further than international law at the time was widely
appreciated. H.R. REP. No. 96-323, at 20 (1979) (noting that drug trafficking "is not
generally accepted as an international crime"); Memorandum from Mark G. Aron,
Acting Gen. Counsel, to Hon. John M. Murphy, Chairman of the Comm. on Merch.
Marine & Fishers in the House of Reps. (April 20, 1979), reprinted in H.R. REP. No.
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in the statute's passage commented on its dramatic expansion of
United States law enforcement powers.220 What is remarkable is
that no one appears to have questioned whether the Marijuana
on the High Seas Act complied with the Due Process Clause. The
one note of caution about the statute that appears in its
legislative history is found in a letter written from the Assistant
Attorney General to the House of Representatives, but even that
referred only to the bill's potential conflicts with international
law.221  Whether the statute afforded due process went
undiscussed. In prosecutions brought under the Marijuana on
the High Seas Act shortly after it was passed, federal courts
sustained the new type of extraterritorial jurisdiction that the
law authorized, also without mentioning potential constitutional
problems.222
96-323, at 20 (1979) (also observing that "drug trafficking on the high seas is not
generally accepted as an international crime"). That the Act did not criminalize
crimes-against-the-sovereign per se was clear from its design. Cf. United States v.
Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922); United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir.
1984); United States v. Fernandez, 496 F.2d 1294 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Williams, 464 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d
Cir. 1968); Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1961).
220 E.g., 126 CONG. REC. 28690 (Oct. 1, 1980) (statement of Rep. Biaggi) ("[Flor
the first time, the U.S. Attorney need not indict suspected smugglers for conspiracy
to import illegal drugs but may charge them with possession with intent to
distribute, a much simpler crime to prove.... Now possession of large quantities of
illegal drugs would give rise to an inference of illegal drug trafficking."); see also
Illegal Drug Traffic on the High Seas: Presidential Statement on Signing H.R. 2538
into Law, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1722 (Sept. 15, 1980) (stating that in making it a "crime to
illegally possess or distribute drugs on the high seas" the legislation will "clos[e] a
loophole in our maritime enforcement laws"); S. REP. No. 96-855, at 2 (1980)
(explaining that the statute departs from current law in stretching United States
extraterritorial jurisdiction to the maximum extent allowed by international law);
H.R. REP. NO. 96-323, at 24 (1979) (same).
221 Memorandum from Patricia M. Wald, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Hon. John
M. Murphy, Chairman of the Comm. on Merch. Marine and Fishers in the House of
Reps. (April 20, 1979), reprinted in H.R. REP. NO. 96-323, at 16-17 (1979). The
Justice Department told Congress that "[ulnder international law, a state does not
have jurisdiction to proscribe . . . conduct" unless it can show "an actual or potential
adverse effect within its territory." Id. at 16. Accordingly, the Justice Department
argued that the law should be framed so that the intent to import drugs into the
United States was a necessary element of the offense for a foreign offender.
222 E.g., United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363 (4th Cir. 1982). In Howard-Aris, the Fourth
Circuit did confront the issue of whether the state's expansive extraterritorial reach
violated international law, as Assistant Attorney General Wald had warned in her
letter to Congress. But the court concluded that even if the statute breached
international law, "the United States may violate international law principles in
order to effectively carry out this nation's policies." Id. at 371-72 (citation omitted).
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In 1986, Congress passed a second extraterritorial statute of
the new breed: the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-
Terrorism Act of 1986 ("Anti-Terrorism Act").2 23 Under the Anti-
Terrorism Act, murder, conspiracy to murder, or "physical
violence" perpetrated abroad would be considered a federal crime
if two conditions were present: (1) a United States national was
the actual or intended victim, and (2) the defendant had intended
to intimidate a government or civilian population.22 4 Congress
passed the Anti-Terrorism Act in response to a widely publicized
incident in 1985, during which a group of rogue terrorists
captured an Italian cruise ship and ended up murdering a
disabled American aboard.2 25 Such conduct would now be
punishable in the United States. In its Conference Report,
Congress clarified that the Act was not aimed at "[slimple
barroom brawls or normal street crime" in foreign countries.2 26
Its goal was to reach terroristic activity that targeted or ended up
harming Americans, as long as the defendant had intended to
intimidate some civilian population.22
Like the Marijuana on the High Seas Act, the Anti-
Terrorism Act did not fall into either of the two buckets of
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction that had long been practiced
in United States courts through 1980. It was not a "universal
jurisdiction" statute, because it criminalized a form of conduct
not yet covered by international law. The multilateral terrorism
conventions in the mid-1980s had deemed certain acts like
hijacking and hostage taking to be universally outlawed,2 " but
the 1986 statute reached broader. It outlawed any physical
violence undertaken to intimidate civilians. 229  The Anti-
223 Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
399, § 1202, 100 Stat. 853 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (2006)).
224 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (2006).
225 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and
International Law, 83 AM. J. IN'L L. 880, 890 (1989).
226 H.R. REP. No. 99-783, at 87 (1986).
227 See id.
228 See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
229 According to Andreas Lowenfeld, the Omnibus Act exceeded Congress's
powers under the Define and Punish Clause of the Constitution because it
authorized United States jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct that was not
forbidden by the law of nations. Lowenfeld, supra note 225, at 891-92 ("[The
constitutionality of the assertion of jurisdiction is, one may safely say, in doubt,
because it ... does not, as written, come within the power to define and punish
offenses against the law of nations. Unable to define terrorism, or at least to make
the legislative finding that terrorism is an offense against the law of nations,
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Terrorism Act also deviated from the Bowman-type statute,
because it did not require the offender to have targeted the
United States government or its sovereign interests. In fact, the
offender did not even need to have targeted a private American
civilian. Rather, the intent to frighten any population, whether
American or not, was sufficient to confer jurisdiction, as long as
one of the actual victims wound up being an American.2 30
Over the next two decades, Congress continued to pass
extraterritorial criminal statutes of the new mold, particularly in
the terrorism sphere. For instance, under the Anti Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress
made it illegal to "knowingly provide[] material support or
resources to a foreign terrorist organization,"23 1 whether done
domestically or extraterritorially. 2" AEDPA, like the Anti-
Terrorism Act of 1986, departed from international law, given
that material support is not outlawed by any multilateral
convention. 33  It also departed from the Bowman-type statute
because it did not require the defendant to intend to harm United
Congress seeks to narrow the effect of the law by authorizing the Attorney General
to make the determination that the crime charged fits within the title and purpose of
the statute. At a minimum, should not the prosecution have to prove the jurisdiction
of the court-that is, jurisdiction to prescribe and to enforce?").
230 See 18 U.S.C. § 2332(d) (2006) ("Limitation on prosecution.-No prosecution
for any offense described in this section shall be undertaken by the United States
except on written certification of the Attorney General or the highest ranking
subordinate of the Attorney General . .. [that] such offense was intended to coerce,
intimidate, or retaliate against a government or a civilian population.") (emphasis
added). The Conference Report explained that the targeted population did not need
to be American, however. H.R. REP. No. 99-783, at 88.
"I Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 303(a), 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(1) (West 2011)).
232 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(d)(2) (West 2011) ("There is extraterritorial Federal
jurisdiction over an offense under this section."). In 2004, Congress added language
to clarify that this extraterritorial jurisdiction included jurisdiction over offenses
committed by United States nationals or by any persons later found in the United
States. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
458, § 6603(d), 118 Stat. 3638, 3763.
233 See supra note 6. See generally Robert M. Chesney, Federal Prosecution of
Terrorism-Related Offenses: Conviction and Sentencing Data in Light of the "Soft-
Setence" and "Data-Reliability" Critiques, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 851, 855 (2007)
(arguing that the material support provision of AEDPA takes a preventative, as
opposed to a strictly punitive, approach to terrorism, punishing conduct that is likely
to give rise to harm even if it is not harmful per se; the "statute does not require any
showing of personal dangerousness on the part of the defendant" and its primary
effect is to "contribute[] to [terrorism] prevention on an untargeted basis by
degrading the ability of unknown members of designated groups to cause harm on
unknown occasions").
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States officials, property, or governmental functions to be liable;
it was enough that the defendant know that the organization to
which he was contributing assistance was designated as an FTO
by the United States government. 2 34  Another example is
Congress's amendments to the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act of 1977235 ("IEEPA"), made in 2007. Under
the original IEEPA statute, Congress authorized the Treasury
Department to prohibit domestic banks that fell under its
regulatory authority from providing financing to terrorist
organizations. 2 36  The 2007 amendments built on IEEPA by
creating a new extraterritorial crime: that of "caus[ing] a
violation of any . .. [the Office of Foreign Assets Control
("OFAC")] regulation."237  Parties not even subject to OFAC's
regulatory authority in the first place-such as foreign banks
located abroad-could now face criminal sanctions under the new
law. 238 Again, like the Marijuana on the High Seas Act, the Anti-
Terrorism Act, and AEDPA, the 2007 IEEPA Amendment did not
fall into either of the two historical buckets of extraterritorial
jurisdiction, for it reached further than international law and it
did not require the perpetration of a crime-against-the-
239sovereign.
234 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2717 (2010) ("Congress
plainly spoke to the necessary mental state for a violation of § 2339B, and it chose
knowledge about the organization's connection to terrorism, not specific intent to
further the organization's terrorist activities.").
235 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 201, 91
Stat. 1626 (1977) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701-07 (2006)).
236 Id. §§ 203, 205; see also Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-
Support Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 19-20
(2005).
237 International Emergency Economic Powers Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No.
110-96, § 206, 121 Stat. 1011 (2007).
238 Alex Lakatos & Jan Blochliger, The Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Anti-
Terrorist Finance Laws: Criminal Prosecution and Civil Litigation Risk for Non-U.S.
Financial Institutions Arising from Operations Outside the United States, Electronic
BANKING L. & COM. REP., June 2010, at 1, 7 , available at http://www.mayerbrown.
com/fsre/article.asp?id=9439&nid=706 ("The phrase 'cause a violation,' added to
IEEPA in 2007, applies to conduct in which a party not directly covered by OFAC
regulations causes a party that is covered by OFAC regulations (e.g., non-U.S. banks
or banks outside of the United States) unwittingly to violate those regulations .... ).
239 A multilateral treaty passed in 1999 did ban terrorist financing. See
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism art. 2,
Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197 (prohibiting any person from "unlawfully and
willfully[] provid[ing] or collect[ing] funds with the intention that they should be
used or in the knowledge that they are to be used . . . to carry out . .. [ain act [that]
constitutes an offence" of terrorism). However, the 2007 IEEPA amendment reached
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Today, the modern day extraterritorial criminal statute is a
staple of the United States' legal system. It is considered an
unexceptional phenomenon. 240  But taking a step back and
considering the 230 year history of the American Republic, one
realizes that this type of statute is a newcomer to the scene. Up
until thirty years ago, the only criminal laws that applied
extraterritorially were those outlawing universal crimes and
crimes against the sovereign, so by nature, they did not raise
problems of notice for the courts to wrestle with.24' The
landscape changed dramatically in 1980 and has continued to
shift ever since. The federal government now views itself as
having the authority and legitimacy to enforce its penal laws
throughout the world, and it is doing so with increasing vigor.
However, the due process doctrines developed by courts in the
civil law context to ensure that jurisdiction is substantively fair,
not to mention constitutional, has not caught up with the facts on
the ground. It is often the case that law lags behind new
developments in society, especially when the source of the law is
the judiciary. Consider how long it took for federal courts to
outlaw segregation or to create the Miranda regime. The federal
courts have yet to catch up to the reality of the modern day
extraterritorial criminal statute. But that does not mean that
the present state of the doctrine is sensible, normatively correct,
or constitutional.
III. ANCHORING EXTRATERRITORIAL PROSECUTIONS
IN DUE PROCESS
This Part agues that the lack of a robust due process
doctrine for the law of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction
in the United States is unacceptable because it conflicts
fundamentally with the tenants of two separate bodies of
American law. Clearly, the lack of a due process doctrine to
regulate extraterritorial prosecutions is inconsistent with the law
on extraterritorial jurisdiction in private civil cases, in which
broader for two reasons: (1) it criminalized "caus[ing] a violation" of an OFAC order
as opposed to causing "an offense" of terrorism in the first place, and (2) unlike the
Convention, it did not specify an intent or knowledge requirement. Lakatos &
Bkichliger, supra note 238.
240 See, e.g., Austen Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality's Fifth Business,
61 VAND. L. REV. 1455, 1456-57 (2008).
241 See supra Part II.
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courts have developed a multi-part "personal jurisdiction" test.
But, one might argue, private law cases are different from
criminal prosecutions. In the former, the plaintiffs are ordinary
persons, and we cannot trust such persons to use the courts with
the same degree of solicitude that we can expect of our public
officials. In other words, one might argue, the fact that we need
to set clear boundaries for limiting jurisdiction in transnational
private suits does not mean that we need them in extraterritorial
criminal cases. We can trust our public officials to do the work of
the "personal jurisdiction" test through their use of prosecutorial
discretion.
However, this Part draws on two other bodies of law in
which the party initiating the lawsuit is also the government,
rather than a private party, in order to show that the lack of due
process parameters for extraterritorial prosecutions is
inconsistent with basic legal principles in the United States
system. The two areas of law to be surveyed are: the criminal
law for domestic defendants, and the application of federal civil
statutes, such as U.S. anti-trust or securities fraud laws, to
extraterritorial defendants. The reason for looking to these two
areas for guidance is that each shares something fundamentally
in common with extraterritorial criminal prosecutions; the
former involves adjudication under American criminal law, and
the latter involves situations of extraterritorial enforcement. As
will be shown below, U.S. courts in both domestic criminal cases
and in civil extraterritorial enforcement cases have developed
robust tests for ensuring that jurisdiction complies with the Due
Process Clause. These two bodies of law are instructive because
they highlight the degree to which the present state of the law on
extraterritorial crimes-and the prevalence of the Bowman
doctrine-is out of sync.
A. Learning from Domestic Criminal Law
When it comes to domestic criminal prosecutions, the Due
Process Clause does important work in ensuring that
prosecutions against the defendant are anchored in his having
been given fair warning of the law. On the one hand, it is a
staple of the criminal law that ignorantia juris non excusat; the
defendant's ignorance of the law, or of the factors that constitute
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the elements of his offense, is no defense.2 42 Except in extremely
rare cases, federal courts will not allow defendants to invoke the
Due Process Clause to block their indictments on the basis of
ignorance of the law, even if they actually did not know their
conduct was criminally banned.2 43 Nonetheless, through at least
three separate doctrines, the Due Process Clause ensures that
criminal jurisdiction vis-&-vis domestic defendants proceed only
when there was a reasonable opportunity for the defendant to
have taken notice.
First, under the Bouie test, the Due Process Clause requires
that judicial interpretations of criminal statutes not be applied
retroactively if those interpretations would be "unexpected and
indefensible" compared to the law already in force." The Bouie
test does not demand proof that the defendant was actually on
notice at the time when he acted, but only evidence that the
average, reasonable person would have been on notice, had they
been in the defendant's shoes. When judges expand the meaning
of criminal statutes for the first time in the process of writing
their opinions, the possibility for any defendant to be on notice
will only be afforded if the interpretations are given prospective
effect.14  The Bouie test protects several of the same interests
that lie behind the Ex Post Facto Clause, but it is doctrinally
anchored in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Second, under the void-for-vagueness test, the Due Process
Clause requires that criminal statutes be sufficiently clear in
what they outlaw before they can be enforced. "[A] statute
242 E.g., United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 225 (1st Cir. 1999) (rejecting a
defendant's Due Process Clause challenge to § 922(g)(8), which makes the existence
of a state court order an element of the federal misdemeanor of illicit possession of a
handgun, because of "the well-established tenet [that] actual knowledge of the law's
requirements is a precondition to criminal liability").
21 One such outlier case is Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229 (1957), in
which the Court struck down a municipal law in Los Angeles making it a crime for
an ex-offender to fail to register. However, the Court has declined to extend Lambert
in subsequent cases and has instead described it as "'an isolated deviation from the
strong current of precedents-a derelict on the waters of the law.'" Texaco, Inc. v.
Short, 454 U.S. 516, 537 n.33 (1982) (quoting Lambert, 355 U.S. at 232).
2" Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354 (1964) ("If a judicial construction
of a criminal statute is 'unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which
had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue,' it must not be given retroactive
effect."); see also Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 458-59 (2001) (applying the
Bouie doctrine).
24' Bouie, 378 U.S. at 353-54.
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which ... forbids .. . an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application" will fail.2 46 The void-for-vagueness
test furthers a separate goal of ensuring that laws are enforced in
a non-arbitrary manner, because when officials are given too
much discretion to enforce capacious legal mandates, they can
use their authority to selectively punish disfavored groups.2 47
But that aside, the central purpose of the void-for-vagueness test
is to guarantee that defendants be given the opportunity to
understand what the law forbids before they are held accountable
under it.248
Third, under the rule of lenity, the Due Process Clause
directs judges to avoid constitutional problems by making narrow
constructions of ambiguous criminal statutes, interpreting those
statutes to reach only the "conduct clearly covered" so that "fair
warning" is ensured.249
All three Due Process Clause doctrines serve a similar
purpose: ensuring that the application of the criminal law to the
defendant is substantively fair by demanding that he has been
given a reasonable opportunity to learn that his behavior could
subject him to punishment in the now-prosecuting jurisdiction.
The doctrines are close cousins of the personal jurisdiction test in
civil cases, but what distinguishes them is that they apply when
it is the federal government-as opposed to a private litigant-
requesting the court to take cognizance of the suit. To date,
these doctrines have been developed and applied primarily with
respect to "domestic" criminal defendants-persons who acted
from within United States territory when they broke the law or
who are United States nationals and thus subject to its penal
regulations in any corner of the globe. However, they
demonstrate that the Due Process Clause is fundamentally
concerned with whether criminal defendants are afforded notice
246 Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); see also City of
Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60 (1999) (holding that under the Due Process
Clause, Chicago's anti-loitering ordinance was unconstitutionally vague "'not in the
sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but
comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of
conduct is specified at all' ") (quoting Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971)).
247 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000); Morales, 527 U.S. at 56.
248 See Hill, 530 U.S. at 732.
249 United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997).
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before they are penalized, and they instruct that the Clause
should, in some fashion, promote the same objectives when it
comes to cases of extraterritorial enforcement.
B. Learning from Extraterritorial Civil Prosecutions
Beyond the domestic criminal law, a second body of law
showing that the Due Process Clause should regulate
extraterritorial criminal prosecutions is that dealing with the
overseas application of federal civil statutes. Since the 1940s,
the United States government has sought to enforce its anti-trust
and securities fraud statutes abroad. Namely, it has brought
civil proceedings against foreign firms on the basis of their
conduct overseas, and it has successfully obtained judgments
against these firms under the federal antitrust and securities
fraud laws. But U.S. courts have not just sustained jurisdiction
without reflection. Instead, they have developed frameworks for
ensuring that the overseas application of the federal antitrust
and securities fraud laws accords with the Due Process Clause
and with common law due process doctrines by demanding that
foreign defendants be given fair warning of the potential for legal
liability. These two bodies of civil law are further illustrations of
why it is only principled that there be a Due Process Clause test
for the extraterritorial reach of United States criminal laws.
1. Anti-trust
The Sherman Act is the United States' central anti-trust
statute. It outlaws any "conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations."2 50
When it was originally passed in 1890, nobody appears to have
considered whether the Sherman Act's prohibition on
monopolistic conduct applied to activities undertaken by firms in
foreign countries. In the early case of American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., the Supreme Court resolved that question in
250 Sherman Antitrust Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)) ("Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
$100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by
imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion
of the court.").
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the negative.25 ' The Court held that when a New Jersey firm had
arranged with the Costa Rican government to set prices for goods
that would be produced in Costa Rica, that agreement was
beyond the reach of the law.2 52 The Sherman Act should be
construed as regulating domestic conduct only, the Court held,
because "the improbability of the United States attempting to
make acts done in Panama or Costa Rica criminal is obvious."253
The American Banana holding prevailed as the governing
interpretation of the Sherman Act for the next several decades.25 4
In the Alcoa litigation in 1945, however, Judge Learned
Hand chartered a new path. The federal government brought a
civil proceeding under the Sherman Act against both Aluminum
Company of America ("Alcoa"), a United States corporation, and
Aluminum Limited ("Limited"), a Canadian firm that was forty-
nine percent owned by American shareholders, for price-fixing
activities in both the United States and overseas.2 55 In what
turned out to be a path-breaking opinion, Judge Hand held that
Section 1 of the Sherman Act could apply in complete
extraterritorial fashion to Limited-meaning it could apply to
that foreign firm's activities, undertaken beyond U.S. borders-
as long as at least two conditions were met. First, the firm had
to have intended for its activities to have monopolistic effects
within the United States. Second, these effects needed to have
materialized.25 6 Judge Hand reasoned:
Did [Limited's price-fixing agreements overseas] violate § 1 of
the Act? The answer .. . [depends on] whether Congress chose
to attach liability to the conduct outside the United States of
251 213 U.S. 347 (1909), overruled in part as stated in Morrison v. Nat'l Austl.
Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2887 n.11 (2010) (holding that an Alabama-based
company could not bring a damages claim under the Sherman Act against a New
Jersey-based company for activities the defendant company conducted in Costa Rica,
in conjunction with the Costa Rican government).
252 Id. at 359.
253 Id. at 357.
254 See, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 275-76 (1927)
(applying the American Banana reading of Sherman Act, but holding that American
Banana was not applicable in the present case because the defendants had
conducted both foreign and domestic activities that were illegal under the statute).
255 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The
cause of action that the federal government invoked was the Clayton Act, which
establishes civil remedies for violations of the Sherman Act and creates a cause of
action for both the Justice Department and private litigants. Id. at 428;
15 U.S.C. § 15a (2006).
256 Aluminum Co. ofAm., 148 F.2d at 443-45.
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persons not in allegiance to it. That being so, the only question
open is whether Congress intended to impose the liability, and
whether our own Constitution permitted it to do so .... Two
situations are possible. There may be agreements made beyond
our borders not intended to affect imports, which do affect them,
or which affect exports.... [Aigreements may on the other
hand intend to include imports into the United States, and yet
it may appear that they had no effect upon them.... We shall
not choose between these alternatives; but for argument we
shall assume that the Act does not cover agreements, even
though intended to affect imports or exports, unless its
performance is shown actually to have had some effect upon
them. Where both conditions are satisfied, the situation
certainly falls within [the Sherman Act's coverage].257
Although Judge Hand never mentioned the Due Process
Clause in his analysis about whether the Sherman Act could be
construed to apply extraterritorially, he crafted his holding in
light of "our own Constitution."25 8 Moreover, his requirement
that Limited intend to have caused harmful effects in the United
States before it could be held civilly liable functioned to achieve
what the Due Process Clause was understood at the time to do
more generally: ensure that jurisdiction accorded with
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."2 59 By
1945, it was well established in American jurisprudence that the
Due Process Clause required that an out-of-state resident be
given warning of his potential to stand in judgment before his
life, liberty, or property could be taken from him.2 80 Judge Hand
did not cite any Due Process Clause precedents in his Alcoa
decision, but his logic was parallel. Just as the Due Process
Clause required that a defendant be on notice of his capability to
incur legal liability before jurisdiction was proper, so too did the
Sherman Act require that foreign firms be given fair warning.
Those firms' intent to cause harmful effects in the United States
was what satisfied the notice requirement-because it was
"settled law" that any person who intends harm within a given
257 Id. at 443-44.
258 Id. at 443.
259 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
260 E.g., McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917) (holding that under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the exertion of sovereign jurisdiction demanded reasonable
notice to the person that the jurisdiction intended to "bind" him). This doctrine was
developed further in International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310, 316, which came down
several months after Judge Hand's Aluminum Co. decision.
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jurisdiction should expect to be held accountable.2 6 1 Over time,
Judge Hand's decision in Alcoa became the benchmark for when
courts can impose civil remedies under the Sherman Act for
extraterritorial conduct. In 1987, the Restatement adopted the
Alcoa framework wholesale,26 2 and in 1993, the Supreme Court
endorsed it by declaring, "[I]t is well established by now that the
Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to
produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the
United States."2 6 3  In cases involving foreign commerce other
than imports, some courts have interpreted a 1982 amendment
as lessening the standard so that causing any "direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable" (as opposed to intended)
effect in a United States market authorized jurisdiction.2 6 4 Since
1995, the Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission
have also adopted this bifurcated approach; they use Alcoa as the
standard for extraterritorial jurisdiction in foreign import cases,
and a "reasonably foreseeable effects" test in non-import cases.26 5
261 Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d at 443 ("[Ilt is settled law-as 'Limited' itself
agrees-that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its
allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders
which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other states will ordinarily
recognize.").
262 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 415(2) (1987) ("Any agreement in restraint of United States trade that is made
outside of the United States, and any conduct or agreement in restraint of such
trade that is carried out predominantly outside of the United States, are subject to
the jurisdiction to prescribe of the United States, if a principal purpose of the
conduct or agreement is to interfere with the commerce of the United States, and the
agreement or conduct has some effect on that commerce.").
2" Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993).
264 E.g., Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 402 (2d Cir. 2002) ("One of
the concerns raised by the defendants is that because of the global nature of today's
markets, any anticompetitive conduct that affects markets abroad could conceivably
have an impact on our economy. But ... [there is a] significant limit on the reach of
the antitrust laws that may address this concern. The 'effect' of the conduct must be
'direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable'. . . . [W]e observe that this limit will
likely prevent conduct that merely has an ancillary effect on our markets from being
actionable under our antitrust laws.") (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2006)).
265 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS § 3.1 (1995), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/internat.htm ("With respect to foreign
import commerce .. .'the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to
produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States.'. . .
[Wlith respect to foreign commerce other than imports, the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1982 ('FTAIA') applies to foreign conduct that has a direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce.") (emphasis added).
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But even the reasonably foreseeable effects test affords the
foreign defendant notice because it requires that he underook
action he should have known was likely to harm U.S. markets.
Finally, one court to date has adopted Judge Hand's test in
Alcoa as the guiding framework for whether the Sherman Act
can be construed to trigger criminal penalties for extraterritorial
conduct. In 1997, the Justice Department filed its first-ever
criminal indictment under the Sherman Act on the basis of a
foreign firm's overseas activities.2 66 That case, Nippon Paper,
involved a Japanese firm that had conspired with Japanese
trading houses to fix the price of paper eventually imported into
the United States.2 67 The First Circuit had to decide whether to
allow an indictment to go forward, given that there was no case
on record in which a defendant had been held criminally liable
under the Sherman Act solely for overseas activity.2 68 The First
Circuit ultimately allowed the prosecution to advance because it
found that the government's indictment met both prongs of the
Alcoa test.269  The prosecution was substantively fair, the court
held, given that the defendant undertook acts whose harmful
impacts on U.S. markets were foreseeable, and thus he should
have expected that an American tribunal would hold him
accountable.270
266 United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997).
267 Id. at 2-3.
2" Id. at 4 ("[Hlere the United States essays a criminal prosecution for solely
extraterritorial conduct rather than a civil action. This is largely uncharted terrain;
we are aware of no authority directly on point, and the parties have cited none.").
269 Id. at 12-13. "The effects on United States markets were foreseeable and
direct. The Government of Japan acknowledges that antitrust regulation is part of
the international legal system, and NPI does not really assert that it has justified
expectations that were hurt by the regulation." Id. While criminal prosecution may
have come as a surprise, NPI should have known that civil antitrust liability could
include treble damages. "The only factor counseling against finding that the United
States' antitrust laws apply to this conduct is the fact that the situs of the conduct
was Japan and that the principals were Japanese corporations. This consideration is
inherent in the nature of jurisdiction based on effects of conduct, where the situs of
the conduct is, by definition, always a foreign country. This alone does not tip the
balance against jurisdiction." Id.
270 Id. at 12. In its petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, the firm argued
that the prosecution ran afoul of the Due Process Clause because it had no reason to
assume that its actions abroad could trigger criminal penalties in the United States.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 19-20, Nippon Paper Indus. Co. v. United States,
552 U.S. 1044 (1998) (No. 96-1987), 1997 WL 33556961 ("The First Circuit's
enlargement of the territorial scope of the Sherman Act's criminal provisions-
without any legitimate antecedent for that expansion-jeopardizes the due process
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Since Nippon Paper, the Justice Department has initiated a
slew of criminal prosecutions against foreigners under the
Sherman Act. In 1999, for instance, it obtained a historic plea
agreement with a Swiss CEO, marking "the first time a foreign
executive agreed to serve time in U.S. prison for his participation
in an international cartel."2 71 As of November 2010, the Justice
Department reports that it has obtained seventy-six corporate
fines worth over $10 million under the Sherman Act to
date, and sixty-six have been against non-United-States-based
companies.2 72  Another source reports that "[alt present,
approximately fifty sitting U.S. grand juries are conducting
[Sherman Act] investigations, and close to one-half of those
investigations involve international cartel activity."273  A
substantial number of these cases involved global cartels and
international conspiracies in which some of the illegal conduct
occurred within the United States.2 74 Thus, they did not involve
exclusive "extraterritorial" activity to the same degree as Nippon
Paper did. But foreigners undertaking activities abroad were
certainly involved. It is premature to guess whether Nippon
Paper will become the widely accepted standard among U.S.
courts in extraterritorial criminal prosecutions under the
rights of Petitioner and future defendants. Petitioner had no reason to believe that
Congress intended such criminal penalties to apply to wholly foreign conduct. While
Alcoa applied the civil provisions of the Sherman Act to overseas conduct, it did not
consider whether the statute exposed foreign actors to criminal sanctions for conduct
undertaken wholly abroad. Since, at common law, penal statutes were interpreted
strictly and were held to have no extraterritorial effect, Petitioner had no reason to
believe that entirely foreign conduct would be subject to criminal penalties in the
United States."). The Court denied certiorari, 522 U.S. 1044 (1998).
27 Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen. for Criminal Enforcement,
Dep't of Justice, Remarks at the National Institute on White Collar Crime: The
Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement over the Last Two Decades (Feb. 25,
2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/publictspeeches/255515.htm#N_10_.
For the plea agreement, see Plea Agreement, United States v. Sommer, No. 3:99-CR-
201-R (N.D. Tex. May 20, 1999), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f2400/
sommer.pdf.
272 Sherman Act Violations Yielding a Corporate Fine of $10 Million or More,
ANTITRUST Div., DEP'T OF JUSTICE (July 12, 2011), http-//www.justice.gov/atr/public/
criminal/shermanl0.html.
273 Robert D. Paul, Expanding Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust
Laws: What Are the Borders?, 16 INT'L L. PRACTICUM 122, 128 (2003) (referring to
criminal investigations).
274 E.g., United States v. Anderson, 326 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2003); see also
Paul, supra note 273, at 127-30 (describing extraterritorial criminal prosecutions
under the Sherman Act since Nippon Paper and describing how many of them
involved global cartels with U.S. counterparts).
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Sherman Act going forwards,2 75 but it has garnered a wide
amount of positive attention,2 76 and given that it follows Alcoa's
formulation, it is likely to be strongly endorsed.
In sum, the civil cases since 1945 involving extraterritorial
enforcement of the Sherman Act-and at least one criminal
case-have conditioned United States jurisdiction over foreign
defendants abroad on a de facto notice requirement. In
demanding that the defendant cause market disruptions that
were either intended to arise in the United States, or that were
at least reasonably foreseeable to arise here, courts have limited
extraterritorial culpability to situations in which foreigners
should have expected to face judgment domestically, given the
effects of their actions. Throughout the past several decades, due
process concerns about the fairness of extraterritorial jurisdiction
have guided the development of U.S. anti-trust law.
2. Securities Fraud
The story regarding the extraterritorial application of U.S.
securities fraud laws is similar to that in the anti-trust area:
Since the 1950s and '60s, the federal government has sought civil
penalties against firms on the basis of their extraterritorial
activities; federal courts have enabled U.S. anti-fraud laws to
apply abroad, but pursuant to notice test crafted in light of the
Due Process Clause; and today, a notice requirement also
appears to attach in extraterritorial criminal prosecutions under
securities fraud statutes.
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is the
nation's primary anti-fraud law that regulates in the securities
market; it prohibits using any "manipulative or deceptive device"
in the purchase or sale of a security through an instrumentality
of interstate commerce. 27 7 It was not until the post-War decades
275 DAN K. WEBB ET AL., CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS § 2.04(1)(c)(i)
(2011) ("[While one circuit has declared that a prosecution based solely on
extraterritorial conduct may be brought, it remains unclear whether other circuits
will follow suit. Furthermore, issues about whether the United States can obtain
personal jurisdiction-as opposed to subject matter jurisdiction-over a foreign
corporation and just how insubstantial or indirect the effect on commerce must be to
preclude an antitrust prosecution essentially of overseas conduct are sure to be
tested.")
276 According to a search by the author, it has been cited 669 times to date.
277 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j (West 2011) ("It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of
the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange .. . [t]o use or
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when the extraterritorial application of Section 10(b) fell onto
anyone's radar screen.2 78 In those years, as had been the case
with the Sherman Act, both the SEC and private litigants began
bringing civil damages suits in U.S. courts premised on violations
of Section 10(b) that presumptively occurred beyond the country's
borders.27 9 In turn, federal courts needed to determine whether
Section 10(b) should be read as applying to activities overseas.
In Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, the
Second Circuit reached a key holding about the extraterritorial
reach of U.S. securities fraud law. It held that under the Due
Process Clause, Section 10(b) of the 1934 Exchange Act could be
construed to apply extraterritorially, as long as the foreign
defendant intended, knew, or should have known that his
conduct abroad would cause harmful effects to securities
investors in the United States.2 8 0 The court's reasoning was even
more expressly tied to the Fifth Amendment than Judge Hand's
opinion had been in Alcoa. The Second Circuit explained that
subject matter jurisdiction under the Securities Exchange Act
was necessarily limited by the Fifth Amendment because
Congress could only criminalize foreign conduct up to the point
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. . . any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors.").
278 The legislative history of the 1934 Act did not discuss extraterritorial subject
matter jurisdiction. See H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 28 (1934); S. REP. No. 73-792, at
23 (1934); see also Louise Corso, Note, Section 10(b) and Transnational Securities
Fraud: A Legislative Proposal To Establish a Standard for Extraterritorial Subject
Matter Jurisdiction, 23 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 573, 573-74 (1989) ("[Tlhe
legislation establishing regulation of the securities market and the Securities and
Exchange Commission ... was written in the 1930s and did not anticipate ... the
impact [technological] advances are having, and will continue to have, in the
international arena. The drafters of the securities laws were not concerned with the
question of foreign trade in securities and did not address the issue of
extraterritorial subject matter jurisdiction in cases of alleged fraud."). The first case
involving extraterritorial jurisdiction in a securities fraud context was in 1960. See
id. at 581 n.45 (citing Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)).
279 E.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1330
(2d Cir. 1972), abrogated in part by, Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct.
2869 (2010) (involving transactions that occurred in England and related to sales of
stock of a British corporation); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 217-18 (2d
Cir. 1968) (involving transactions that occurred in Canada when stocks in a
Canadian corporation were sold).
"' See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 468 F.2d at 1333-39.
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that the Fifth Amendment permitted. 281  Next, it held that
personal jurisdiction in Section 10(b) cases, just as in all civil
cases involving transnational activity, had to be premised on a
strong notice requirement for the defendant. 2 82 The court stated:
[I]t is 'essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws.'
At minimum the conduct must meet .. . the important
requirement that the effect 'occurs as a direct and foreseeable
result of the conduct outside the territory.' . . . The person
sought to be charged must know, or have good reason to know,
that his conduct will have effects in the state seeking to assert
jurisdiction over him.283
The Second Circuit thus drew on Due Process Clause cases
like International Shoe to condition extraterritorial jurisdiction
under Section 10(b) on a "foreseeable result" standard.2 84 This
became the universal benchmark for applying Section 10(b)
overseas. Courts drew on Leasco Data Processing in cases
brought by the SEC against foreign firms,28 5 and by the 1980s the
case became binding precedent in numerous federal circuits.2 86
281 The court recognized that when a case involved wholly foreign conduct, a
court could only effectuate Congress's intent with respect to § 10(b) in compliance
with "Fifth Amendment" limitations. See id. at 1334 ("[I1f Congress ha[d] expressly
prescribed a rule with respect to conduct outside the United States, even one going
beyond the scope recognized by foreign relations law, a United States court would be
bound to follow the Congressional direction unless this would violate the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment.").
282 Id. at 1340.
283 Id. at 1340-41.
284 Id.
285 E.g., SEC v. Capital Growth Co., 391 F. Supp. 593, 596-98 (S.D.N.Y 1974)
(holding that jurisdiction over § 10(b) claims was proper as long as there was either
"significant conduct within the territorial limits of the United States
or ... extraterritorial conduct which was harmful to and which had an impact upon
United States investors" and that the SEC's pleadings satisfied both standards).
286 See, e.g., Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 30, 32 (D.C. Cir.
1987); Cont'l Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 420 (8th
Cir. 1979); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977); see also Donald H.J.
Hermann, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction in Securities Laws Regulation, 16
CuMB. L. REv. 207, 220 (1986) (recounting how the "Fifth and Ninth Circuits have
substantially adopted the Second Circuit's approach in determining extraterritorial
jurisdiction in securities cases").
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Moreover, as federal courts applied Leasco Data Processing
to new extraterritoriality situations that emerged in the 1980s
and '90s, they were careful to do so in light of due process
principles. In IIT v. Vencap, for instance, the Second Circuit held
that a foreign firm's activities abroad did not trigger liability
under Section 10(b) because the firm had no shares listed on any
American exchange and no reason to assume that its conduct,
even if illegal under Section 10(b), would impact U.S. investors.2 87
In Pinker v. Roche Holdings, on the other hand, the Third Circuit
held that a firm's fraudulent filings abroad could trigger liability
in the United States because the firm had actively sought to
reach U.S. investors.2 88 It concluded that "[a] foreign corporation
that purposefully avails itself of the American securities market
has adequate notice that it may be haled into an American court
for fraudulently manipulating that market."289  The American
Law Institute in 1987 reiterated the spirit of these cases when it
directed courts to evaluate extraterritorial jurisdiction for
securities frauds through a lens of "reasonableness"o and to
take into account the justifiable expectations of defendants.2 9 1
287 IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1016-17 (2d Cir. 1975) ("Taking the view
most favorable to the plaintiffs, the 300 American fundholders were only .2% of IIT's
fundholders.... [Wie cannot believe that Congress would have intended the anti-
fraud provisions of the securities laws to apply if Pistell, in London, had defrauded a
British investment trust by selling foreign securities to it simply because half of one
per cent of its assets was held by Americans. Clearly this is not within the
formulation in Schoenbaum .... And even though Schoenbaum does not necessarily
set the outmost reaches for subject matter jurisdiction with respect to foreign
activities having effect within the United States, the losses from this $3,000,000
investment to these 300 American investors, owning only some .5% of a foreign
investment trust ... and the shares of which apparently were not intended to be
offered to American residents or citizens, is not the 'substantial' effect within the
territory of which the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law s 18(b) (ii) speaks.").
Compare id., with Consol. Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 262 (2d
Cir. 1989) ("In this case, the District Court should have asserted jurisdiction once it
noted that [the defendant company] knew that [its officers] were required by law to
forward the tender offer documents to Gold Fields' shareholders and ADR depository
banks in the United States. This 'effect' (the transmittal of the documents by the
nominees) was clearly a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the
territory of the United States.").
288 Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 371-72 (3d Cir. 2002).
289 Id.; see also Itoba Ltd. v. LEP Group PLC, 930 F. Supp. 36, 41 (D. Conn.
1996) (holding that jurisdiction was proper in a § 10(b) suit given that the foreign
firm had issued ADRs on the NASDAQ).
290 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 416 cmt. a (1987) ("The reach and application of securities legislation of the United
States depend on their reasonableness as determined by evaluation under § 403 in
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The federal government has not yet brought any criminal
prosecutions under Section 10(b) on the basis of extraterritorial
conduct. The likely reason for this is that unlike the Justice
Department's Antitrust Division, the SEC has no criminal
enforcement power and so would have to hand over cases that it
deems ripe for criminal prosecution to United States attorneys'
offices, which would then start from square one.2 2 Nonetheless,
were the government to start bringing criminal prosecutions
under Section 10(b) for extraterritorial violations, it would
almost certainly be required follow Leasco Data Processing. The
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010 declared that "the
district courts of the United States . .. shall have jurisdiction"
over all civil and criminal actions brought under Section 10(b)
whenever "conduct occurring outside the United States ... has a
foreseeable substantial effect within the United States."29 3 This
statute appears to codify the principles set forth in Leasco Data
Processing, for when extraterritorial jurisdiction for a
Section 10(b) violation is appropriate.
The lesson from the securities fraud cases is similar to that
from the anti-trust cases. The United States government has
sought extraterritorial application of federal statutes for decades,
the light of the principal purpose of the legislation.. .. The reasonableness of the
exercise of jurisdiction depends not only on the territorial links of a given activity
with the United States, but also on the character of the activity to be
regulated ... ).
291 See, e.g., id. § 416 reporter's n.2 ("In situations contemplated in Subsection
(1)(b) ... [i]f the persons involved are in the United States only transitorily, for
instance if a national of state X and a national of state Y meet in New York for
convenience and one fraudulently induces the other to make purchases of Japanese
securities on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, it might not be reasonable to apply the
United States securities laws, because neither party acted with the expectation that
those laws would apply and neither the actors nor the market involved was within
the zone of protection of United States securities legislation.").
29 Nic Heuer et al., Twenty-Second Survey of White Collar Crime: Securities
Fraud, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 955, 1014-15 (2007) (explaining that the SEC's
"enforcement authority does not include criminal sanctions" and that "[t]he standard
method for determining whether a violation warrants criminal prosecution requires
the SEC to prepare and forward a referral to the DOJ").
29 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 929P(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1865 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa
(West 2011)). Congress passed this provision of the Dodd-Frank Act in order to
overturn a 2010 Supreme Court case that interpreted Section 10(b) as not applying
abroad. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010) (holding
that as a matter of statutory interpretation "there is no affirmative indication in the
Exchange Act that § 10(b) applies extraterritorially, and we therefore conclude that
it does not").
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and courts have in turn granted it, but pursuant to a framework
that ensures that the defendant be put on notice of his potential
to face liability in the United States. Just as Alcoa and its
progeny used the defendant's intent to harm U.S. markets (or, for
some courts in non-import cases, the defendant's causing of
"direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable" effects),294
Leasco Data Processing used the defendant's causing of
"reasonably foreseeable" harms to U.S. securities markets as a
proxy for notice and the fairness of imposing jurisdiction.
C. Positive Developments in Ninth Circuit Drug-Trafficking
Cases
The two bodies of law surveyed in this Part thus far-
domestic criminal law and cases involving the extraterritorial
application federal civil statutes-both point in the same
direction: The Due Process Clause should be playing a role in
policing the fairness of extraterritorial criminal prosecutions.
The good news is that in one area of extraterritorial criminal
enforcement today, at least as dealt with by one federal circuit,
courts appear to be getting the message. In drug-trafficking
cases since the 1990s, district and appeals courts in the Ninth
Circuit have been invoking the Due Process Clause to set the
boundaries of jurisdiction in extraterritorial jurisdiction.2 95
In recent years, foreign defendants have started to challenge
their indictments and convictions for drug trafficking offenses
under the Due Process Clause, claiming that their subjection to
American penal law on the basis of their extraterritorial conduct
deprived them of fair warning.296 In all seven circuits in which
such claims have been raised in drug-trafficking cases, courts
have acknowledged that the Due Process Clause does apply.29 7
294 See supra notes 264-65.
"2 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1990)
21 See, e.g., United States v. Mohammad-Omar, 323 F. App'x 259, 260 (4th Cir.
2009).
297 See id. at 261 ("[Wlhile Congress may clearly express its intent to reach
extraterritorial conduct, a due process analysis must be undertaken to ensure the
reach of Congress does not exceed its constitutional grasp."); United States v. Suerte,
291 F.3d 366, 372 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 553 (1st
Cir. 1999); United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993);
Davis, 905 F.2d at 248; United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1384 (11th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Umeh, 762 F. Supp. 2d 658, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding
that the indictment satisfies the "nexus" requirement that attaches under the Fifth
Amendment).
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Only the Ninth Circuit has developed a robust test for assessing
whether due process was actually afforded based on the facts of
the defendant's case.298 In the First Circuit, the due process
standard is that prosecution cannot be "arbitrary or
fundamentally unfair," but courts will deem the government's
efforts to punish drug trafficking on the high seas as meeting
that standard, ipso facto. 299  In the Third,3 00 Fiftho30  and
Eleventh Circuits,3 02 appellate courts have acknowledged that the
Due Process Clause requires that the defendant have been
afforded notice, but they conclude that such notice is
categorically satisfied in drug trafficking cases given that the
practice is condemned by many developed states.0 3 In the
Fourth Circuit, there is only one, unpublished opinion linking
298 See Davis, 905 F.2d at 248-49 (explaining that there must be a sufficient
nexus between the defendant's conduct and the United States in order to satisfy the
constraints of the Fifth Amendment).
2" E.g., Cardales, 168 F.3d at 553. But see United States v. Angulo-Hernandez,
576 F.3d 59, 61 (1st Cir. 2009) (Tourella, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc) (rejecting the claim "that drug trafficking, generally, is such a global threat
that the United States is justified in protecting itself by prosecuting traffickers
anywhere, regardless of the destination of the drug shipment" and urging that the
First Circuit "require[] a showing that the particular conduct endangered the
United States" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
300 United States v. Perez-Oviedo, 281 F.3d 400, 403 (3d Cir. 2002) ("[N]o due
process violation occurs in an extraterritorial prosecution under the MDLEA when
there is no nexus between the defendant's conduct and the United States. Since drug
trafficking is condemned universally by law-abiding nations, we reasoned that there
was no reason for us to conclude that it is fundamentally unfair for Congress to
provide for the punishment of a person apprehended with narcotics on the high
seas." (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Martinez-Hidalgo, 993
F.2d at 1056 ("Inasmuch as the trafficking of narcotics is condemned universally by
law-abiding nations, we see no reason to conclude that it is 'fundamentally unfair'
for Congress to provide for the punishment of persons apprehended with narcotics
on the high seas.").
30 Suerte, 291 F.3d at 377 (citing the United Nations Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, opened for signature 20 Dec.
1988, 28 I.L.M. 493, as evidence that foreigners were on notice).
302 United States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding a
Colombian captain of a ship, which had been detained on the high seas and was
carrying a large quantity of cocaine, could be prosecuted under federal law without
raising due process problems because drug trafficking is "generally recognized as a
crime by nations that have reasonably developed legal systems").
" See supra notes 300-02.
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drug trafficking to due process,304 and in the Second Circuit,
there are only district court level opinions on the topic,305 so it is
too early to conclude what the doctrine in those circuits will be.
In the Ninth Circuit alone, the courts have developed a
robust "nexus" test in drug trafficking cases to ensure that
extraterritorial jurisdiction is consistent with the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.0 This test requires that a
defendant have either intent or reasonable foresight that his
activities abroad will result in the trafficking of illicit drugs
within the United States in order for him to be deemed
prosecutable. 07  The Ninth Circuit's nexus test was well
articulated in the recent case of United States v. Perlaza, the one
case to date in which a federal court dismissed a criminal
indictment against a defendant based on a finding that the
exertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction was inconsistent with the
Due Process Clause.3 08
In Perlaza, the United States charged seven foreigners with
federal drug trafficking crimes after they were found aboard a
Colombian vessel, the Gran Tauro, 300 miles from the coast of
Colombia.30 9  From helicopter surveillance, the United States
11 The Fourth Circuit has only resolved one extraterritorial drug trafficking
case to date, and it did so in an unpublished opinion. United States v. Mohammad-
Omar, 323 F. App'x 259, 261 (4th Cir. 2009). While the court in Mohammad-Omar
followed the Ninth Circuit and adopted a rigorous due process test for evaluating
extraterritorial jurisdiction in drug trafficking cases, it is too early to determine
whether that holding will garner precedential value.
so1 E.g., United States v. Umeh, 762 F. Supp. 2d 658, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(holding that the indictment satisfies the "nexus" requirement that attaches under
the Due Process Clause). It is arguable that the Second Circuit's opinion in United
States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2003), a hijacking case, adopted a
nexus test that should apply in all extraterritoriality cases in the Second Circuit,
including drug trafficking cases. However, there are post-Yousef district court
opinions that fail to require a nexus in drug trafficking indictments-for example,
United States v. Manuel, 371 F. Supp. 2d 404, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)-and there is still
no appellate decision that extends Yousef in such a criminal proceeding.
" This test was first developed in United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248-49
(9th Cir. 1990), and it has been applied consistently by courts in the Ninth Circuit
ever since. E.g., United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1257 (9th Cir. 1998).
.o. E.g., Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d at 1257 (holding that "the plan for
shipping the drugs [must have been] likely to have effects in the United States"
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Davis, 905 F.2d at 249 (holding that Davis's
prosecution was constitutional because the government put forth sufficient evidence
to show that "Davis intended to smuggle contraband into United States territory").
308 439 F.3d at 1168.
" Id. at 1153, 1155.
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Navy had observed the Gran Tauro working with an unregistered
speedboat in the middle of the ocean.31 0  The Coast Guard
approached both ships, and the speedboat dropped 2,000
kilograms of cocaine into the sea.1 United States authorities
interdicted the Gran Tauro and arrested all persons aboard,
concluding that the vessel had been providing support to the
speedboat as it made runs between Colombia and Mexico.312
After a three-week jury trial in the Southern District of
California, the seven members of the Gran Tauro were found
guilty of drug trafficking and were sentenced to years in
prison.313
On appeal, the defendants argued that their convictions ran
afoul of the Due Process Clause. They claimed that the United
States had not alleged in the indictment that there was any
connection between them and the United States, and that
without proving such, the government's attempt to impose
extraterritorial jurisdiction did not meet the Fifth Amendment's
notice requirement.3 1 4 The Ninth Circuit agreed and vacated the
convictions. It held that for the United States to extend its
criminal law to persons aboard foreign-flag vessels, it must prove
that there was "nexus between the prohibited activity and the
United States."15 Nexus is what ensures that extraterritorial
drug trafficking prosecutions comply with the Due Process
Clause because it ensures that "a defendant is not improperly
haled before a court for trial . .. [It] serves the same purpose as
the 'minimum contacts' test in personal jurisdiction."" In
Perlaza, the government had not shown that the persons aboard
the speedboat or the Gran Tauro had any connection to a U.S.
market.3 17 Thus, there was no reason that the defendants should
have legitimately expected that their actions would make them
criminals in the United States.1 '
"o Id. at 1155.
311 Id. at 1152-53.
312 Id. at 1153.
31 Id. at 1153-58.
314 Id. at 1160.
315 Id. at 1168.
316 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d
819, 830 n.8 (9th Cir. 2003)).
31 Id. at 1169.
* Id. at 1168 (citing United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1257
(9th Cir. 1998)).
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The Ninth Circuit also rejected the United States' claim
that jurisdiction over the defendants met constitutional muster
even without a showing of nexus because drug trafficking is
both an offense outlawed internationally and a crime against
the United States' sovereign interests.3 1 9 In making these
arguments, the prosecution was harkening back to the two types
of extraterritorial jurisdiction that U.S. courts had long
sanctioned-that over universal crimes and crimes against the
sovereign. But the Ninth Circuit was not convinced. It did
not find drug trafficking to be equivalent to piracy or slave
trading, and it refused to accept that "foreign ships 500 miles
offshore ... that ... might be bound for Canada, South America,
or Zanzibar" necessarily offended our country's "security or
governmental functions."320  The imposition of extraterritorial
jurisdiction in Perlaza, the Ninth Circuit concluded, did not fall
into the universal jurisdiction bucket or into the Bowman
bucket.3 2 ' Fair warning to the defendants of their potential
criminal liability could not be assumed based on the nature of
their offense, and the nexus requirement thus needed to be
satisfied.
As the Perlaza case demonstrates, the Ninth Circuit's nexus
test imports a constructive notice requirement into the drug
trafficking cases to ensure that due process is afforded. It
functions very similarly to the Alcoa test that courts apply
in extraterritorial anti-trust cases and to the Leasco Data
Processing test that courts use in securities-fraud cases. Under
Alcoa, a defendant's intent to cause monopolistic effects in U.S.
markets is what puts him on notice of his potential to stand in
judgment.3 22  Under Leasco Data Processing, the defendant's
intent, knowledge, or causing of reasonably foreseeable harms to
U.S. investors is what legitimates jurisdiction.3 23 Under the
Ninth Circuit's nexus test, it must be reasonably foreseeable to a
defendant that the drug-scheme in which he participated "was
likely to result in the distribution of illicit narcotics in U.S.
31 Id. at 1161-63.
320 Id. at 1162 (second alteration in original).
321 Id. at 1163.
322 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945).
323 Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1341 (2d
Cir. 1972), abrogated in part by, Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869
(2010).
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markets.32 4 Accordingly, when a boat is hundreds of miles from
the United States and there is no circumstantial or direct
evidence that the narcotics aboard were likely to wind up within
United States borders, as was the case in Perlaza, jurisdiction
does not lie.32 5 It is promising that a few courts in the Fourth
and Second Circuits have adopted the Ninth Circuit nexus test in
drug trafficking in reecent years, though only at the district court
level and in unpublished opinions.326
CONCLUSION:
APPLYING THE LESSONS TO EXTRATERRITORIAL
TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS
The analysis in this Article, particularly in Part III, instructs
that the Due Process Clause should be made to apply in
extraterritorial terrorism prosecutions. The lack of a due process
test in those cases is a product of historical fact and of the recent
vintage of American criminal statutes that trigger "notice"
concerns when applied abroad. But when courts fail to ensure
that extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction is anchored in due
process, they not only jeopardize the rights of the defendant, they
also depart from key principles that govern in other areas of
United States law. It is indefensible for courts to discard fairness
and notice concerns when it comes to applying the criminal law
overseas, but to be guided by such concerns for domestic criminal
enforcement and for extraterritorial civil enforcement.
So, what might a due process test for the extraterritorial
application of United States criminal law entail, and specifically,
for terrorism statutes? Admittedly, the development of a
comprehensive test will be best achieved through an iterative,
case-by-case process in which the Justice Department and U.S.
courts slowly carve out rules over time. Nonetheless, this Article
suggests three principles that should animate a due process test
for extraterritorial terrorism cases, going forward.
324 United States v. Medjuck, 156 F.3d 916, 918-19 (9th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Ilimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1257 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that "the
plan for shipping the drugs [must have been] likely to have effects in the United
States" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
325 See Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1168-69.
326 See supra notes 304-05 and accompanying text.
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First, acts of terrorism that qualify as universal crimes
should always fall under United States criminal jurisdiction, no
matter where they are committed or by whom. Prosecuting such
acts in the United States does not trigger notice concerns because
if the act is universally condemned, it is by definition capable of
being punished anywhere. Just as courts have sanctioned
jurisdiction over piracy since the Founding, they should so do for
terrorist activities that violate the law of nations.32 7 The
defendant's plane hijacking in Yousef was thus rightly
punishable in an American court pursuant to this principle.
Second, acts of terrorism that directly affront United States
sovereignty or governmental functions should also fall under
United States jurisdiction without running afoul of the Due
Process Clause. This is the lesson of the Bowman doctrine.
Attacks on U.S. military bases overseas or against U.S. officials
located abroad, or cyber-attacks that seek to undermine United
States governmental functions, would qualify. Again, due
process is not an issue because notice of the potential to face
criminal liability in the United States is provided for by the
nature of the act itself. Anyone intentionally aiming to disrupt a
governmental function should expect that government to hold
him accountable.
Third, extraterritorial acts of terrorism that meet a "nexus"
test-similar to the test deployed by federal courts in civil anti-
trust and securities fraud cases, or by the Ninth Circuit in
extraterritorial drug trafficking cases-should also fall under
United States jurisdiction, consistent with the Due Process
Clause. When a foreign national perpetrates an act of terrorism
abroad, a U.S. court should ensure that the act bears sufficient
"nexus" to the United States before taking jurisdiction. The
nexus test, in turn, should have two prongs. First, a mens-rea-
to-harm-the-United-States prong: the defendant must possess a
requisite degree of mens rea that his conduct will cause harm to
an American person, place, or thing. Second, a constructive-
notice-of-criminal-liability prong: the harm that the defendant
327 There have been several international terrorism conventions passed since the
1970s that United States courts should look to for guidance. E.g., International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, supra note 239.
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causes must, by its nature, constructively put the defendant on
notice that he is likely to face criminal penalties in the United
States.328
This third principle for extraterritorial jurisdiction will be
difficult to apply in practice because each prong of the nexus test
will require courts to draw difficult lines. For the first prong,
what level of mens rea for harming a United States person, place,
or thing should courts require? Surely, a defendant's intent to
harm an American or an American city, etcetera, should give rise
to jurisdiction, and his reckless indifference towards causing that
harm will likely satisfy fairness concerns as well. But how about
when a defendant undertakes conduct abroad for which it is
reasonably foreseeable that harm to a United States person, place
or thing will result? The Ninth Circuit has held in drug
trafficking cases that this degree of mens rea is sufficient;
namely, that when a defendant commits acts abroad, and it is
reasonably foreseeable that these acts will cause the harmful
result of drug trafficking in the United States, jurisdiction is
proper.329 But federal courts might not always find this rationale
to yield fair results in terrorism cases. For instance, when a
person (located abroad) donates food to a group classified as an
FTO (also located abroad), and it is reasonably foreseeable that
the group will use its saved resources to subsequently cause
harm to the United States, has the donor displayed sufficient
mens rea to make him a criminal under United States law?
For the second prong, difficult line drawing, again, will be
inevitable. What types of "harm" to an American person, place,
or thing should be deemed to give a defendant constructive notice
of the potential to face criminal penalty in the United States?
Certainly, causing the harm of physical injury to an American
person or property confers notice, but how about causing the
328 See Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 12, at 1243-44 (suggesting a similar test
for extraterritorial jurisdiction generally in both civil and criminal cases; "[Our
suggested] approach to fairness requires that the defendant, by his or her own
actions, must have voluntarily affiliated him or herself with the United States. ...
By purposefully bringing about harm within the United States, the defendant
submits to United States law. On this view ... the defendant's voluntary contacts
are precisely what makes the assertion of jurisdiction fair. Numerous difficulties are
posed by this consent-based or 'voluntarist' notion of jurisdiction. Yet there is no
doubt that it captures some deeply held intuitions of Anglo-American political
thought about fair subjection to sovereign power.").
329 See, e.g., Medjuck, 156 F.3d at 919.
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"harm" of extra volunteering at an FTO's relief center or of
broadcasting an FTO's message on the airwaves? United States
law considers such acts of material support to terrorist groups to
be sufficiently harmful to trigger criminal penalty, but would an
extraterritorial defendant be on constructive notice of that fact?
The nuances of the "nexus" test are not easily resolved,
but the time has come for U.S. courts to start taking these
questions seriously. A Due Process Clause test to ensure that
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction is consistent with American
normative and constitutional principles is far past due.
